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Abstract 
Wireless sensor networks are composed of small, battery-powered devices called 
sensor nodes with restricted data processing, storage capabilities. Sensor nodes collect 
environmental data, such as temperature, humidity, light conditions, and transmit them 
using their integrated radio communication interface. In real life scenarios, the exact 
position of a node is not determined prior to deployment because their deployment 
methods are arbitrary. 
Wireless sensor networks may be used for critical operations such as military 
tracking, scientific and medical experiments. Sensor nodes may carry sensitive 
information. In such cases, securing communication between sensor nodes becomes an 
essential problem. Sensor nodes may easily be impersonated and compromised by 
malicious parties. In order to prevent this, there is a need for some cryptographic 
infrastructure. Public key cryptography is infeasible for sensor nodes with limited 
computation power. Hence symmetric key cryptography mechanisms are applied in 
order to provide security foundations. Due to resource constraints in sensor nodes, best 
solution seems to be symmetric key distribution prior to deployment. For each node, a 
number of keys are drawn uniformly random without replacement from a pool of 
symmetric keys and loaded in the node’s memory. After deployment, neighboring 
sensor nodes may share a key with a certain probability since all the keys are drawn 
from the same key pool. This is the basic idea of key predistribution schemes in 
wireless sensor networks. 
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Also there are more advanced deployment models that take the change of network 
in time into consideration. The nodes are powered by batteries and the batteries 
eventually deplete in time. However the network needs to operate longer than the 
lifetime of a single node. In order to provide continuity, nodes are deployed and 
integrated in the network at different times along the operation of the network. These 
networks are called multiphase wireless sensor networks. The main challenge of these 
networks is to provide connectivity between node pairs deployed at different times. 
In this thesis, we proposed three different key predistribution schemes. In the first 
scheme, we introduce the concept of XORed key, which is the bitwise XOR of two 
regular (a.k.a single) keys. Sensor nodes are preloaded with a mixture of single and 
XORed keys. Nodes establish secure links by shared XORed keys if they can. If no 
shared XORed key exists between two neighboring nodes, they try single keys loaded in 
their memory. If node pairs do not have any shared XORed or single keys, they transfer 
keys from their secure neighbors in a couple of ways, and use them to match with their 
XORed keys. In this scheme, we aim to have a more resilient network to malicious 
activities by using XORed keys since an attacker has to know either both single key 
operands or the XORed key itself. We performed several simulations of our scheme and 
compared it with basic scheme [4]. Our scheme is up to 50% more connected as 
compared to basic scheme. Also it has better resilience performance at the beginning of 
a node capture attack and when it starts to deteriorate the difference between the 
resilience of our proposed scheme and basic scheme is not greater than 5%. 
The second scheme that we proposed is actually an extension that can be applied 
to most of the schemes. We propose an additional phase that is performed right after 
shared keys between neighboring nodes are discovered. As mentioned above, 
neighboring node pairs share a common key with a certain probability. Obviously some 
neighboring node pairs fail to find any shared key. In our proposed new phase, keys 
preloaded in memories of secure neighbors of a node a are transferred to a, if necessary, 
in order for a to establish new links with its neighboring nodes that they do not share 
any key. In this way, we achieve the same connectivity with traditional schemes with 
significantly fewer keys. We compared the performance of our scheme with basic 
scheme [4] after shared-key discovery phase and our results showed that our scheme 
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achieved the same local connectivity performance with basic scheme, moreover while 
doing that, nodes in our scheme are loaded with three fourth of keys fewer than the keys 
loaded in nodes in basic scheme. In addition to that, our scheme is up to 50% more 
resilient than basic scheme with shared-key discovery phase under node capture attacks. 
The last scheme that we proposed is designed to be used for multi-phase wireless 
sensor networks. In our model, nodes are deployed at the beginning of some time 
epochs, called generations, in order to replace the dead nodes. Each generation has 
completely different key pool. Nodes are predistributed keys drawn uniformly random 
from key pools of different generations in order to have secure communication with 
nodes deployed at those generations. In other words, in our scheme keys are specific to 
generation pairs. This makes the job of attacker more difficult and improves the 
resiliency of our scheme. We compared our scheme to another key predistribution 
scheme designed for multi-phase wireless sensor networks. Our results showed that our 
scheme is up to 35% resilient in steady state even under heavy attacks. 
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Kablosuz Duyarga Ağları 
Özet 
Kablosuz duyarga ağları, duyarga düğümü adı verilen küçük, pille çalışan ve 
veriyi kısıtlı bir şekilde işleme ve saklama yeteneği olan aygıtlardan oluşur. Duyarga 
düğümleri sıcaklık, nem, ışık düzeyi gibi ortam bilgilerini toplar ve radyo iletişim 
arayüzünü kullanarak bu bilgileri iletirler. Gerçek hayatta dağıtım yöntemleri 
gelişigüzel olduğundan yerleştirilme öncesi kesin durumları belirlenemez. 
Kablosuz duyarga ağları ordu takip sistemleri, bilimsel ve tıbbi araştırmalar gibi 
bir çok kritik öneme sahip operasyon için kullanılabilirler ve duyarga düğümleri hassas 
bilgileri taşıyabilirler. Bu gibi durumlarda duyarga düğümleri arasındaki iletişimi 
güvenlik altına almak bir zorunluluk haline gelir. Duyarga düğümleri kötü niyetli 
gruplar tarafından kolaylıkla taklit edilebilir ve ele geçirilebilirler. Bunu önlemek için 
kriptografik bir altyapıya ihtiyaç vardır. Sınırlı hesaplama gücü olan duyarga düğümleri 
için açık anahtar kriptografisi makul değildir. Bu yüzden, güvenliği tesis etmek için 
simetrik anahtar kriptografi mekanizmaları uygulanır. Duyarga düğümlerindeki kaynak 
sıkıntısı nedeniyle en iyi çözüm, yerleştirilme öncesi simetrik anahtar dağıtımı olarak 
gözükmektedir. Her düğüm için belli sayıda anahtar, bir simetrik anahtar havuzundan 
yerine konmaksızın rastgele bir şekilde çekilir ve düğümün belleğine yüklenir. Tüm 
anahtarlar aynı anahtar havuzundan seçildiğinden, yerleştirildikten sonra komşu 
duyarga düğümleri belli bir olasılıkla anahtar paylaşabilirler. Kablosuz duyarga düğümü 
ağlarındaki anahtar ön dağıtımı şemalarının temel fikri budur. 
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Ağın zaman içindeki değişimini ele alan daha gelişmiş yerleştirme yöntemleri de 
mevcuttur. Düğümler pille çalışır ve zaman içinde er geç pilleri tükenir. Diğer taraftan, 
ağın bir düğümün yaşam süresinden çok daha uzun süre çalışması gerekmektedir. Ağın 
devamlılığını sağlamak için düğümler ağın çalışması boyunca farklı zamanlarda 
yerleştirilir ve sisteme dahil edilirler. Bu tür ağlar çoklu evreli kablosuz duyarga ağları 
olarak adlandırılır. Bu ağlarda çözülmesi gereken sorun, farklı zamanlarda yerleştirilen 
düğüm çiftleri arasındaki bağlantıyı sağlayabilmektir. 
Bu tezde üç farklı anahtar ön dağıtım şeması teklif edilmiştir. İlk şemada, iki 
sıradan anahtarın (tek anahtar) bit bazında XORlanmısıyla (dışlamalı ya da işlemine tabi 
tutulması) oluşan XORlu anahtar kavramını sunuyoruz. Duyarga düğümlerinin 
belleklerine tek ve XORlu anahtarların oluşturduğu bir karışım yüklenir. Düğümler ilk 
olarak XORlu anahtarları kullanarak güvenli bağlantı kurarlar. Eğer hiç ortak XORlu 
anahtar bulunmuyorsa tek anahtarları kullanmayı denerler. Eğer düğüm çifti arasında 
ortak herhangi bir XORlu veya tek anahtar bulunmuyorsa çeşitli yöntemlerle güvenli 
komşularından anahtar transfer eder ve XORlu anahtarlarıyla eşleştirmek için 
kullanırlar. XORlu anahtarları kullanmamızdaki amaç kötü niyetli faaliyetlere karşı 
daha dayanıklı bir ağ elde etmektir, çünkü bu durumda bir saldırganın ya XORlu 
anahtarı oluşturan iki tek anahtarı ya da XORlu anahtarın kendisini bilmesi 
gerekmektedir. Şemamızın çeşitli simülasyonlarını çalıştırdık ve temel şema [4] ile 
karşılaştırdık. Şemamız temel şemayla karşılaştırıldığında %50’ye kadar daha 
bağlantılıdır. Ayrıca düğüm ele geçirme saldırısının başında daha iyi performans 
sergilemekte ve kötüleşme durumunda temel şema ile arasındaki fark %5’i 
geçmemektedir. 
Önerdiğimiz ikinci şema aslında çoğu şemaya uygulanabilecek bir eklentidir. 
Komşu düğümler arasında paylaşılan anahtarların keşfinden hemen sonra 
çalıştırılabilecek ek bir evre teklif ediyoruz. Komşu düğüm çiftlerinin belli bir olasılık 
ile ortak bir anahtar paylaştığından yukarıda bahsedildi. Açıkçası bazı komşu düğüm 
çiftleri herhangi bir ortak anahtar bulmakta başarısız olurlar. Teklif edilen yeni 
evremizde bir a düğümü, daha önceden bağlantı kurduğu güvenli komşularının 
belleğinde tutulan anahtarları gerekli görürse kendisine transfer edebilir ve ortak anahtar 
paylaşmayan komşularıyla bağlantı kurmak için kullanabilir. Bu yolla geleneksel 
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şemalardaki aynı yerel bağlantı değerlerini düğüm belleklerinde önemli ölçüde daha az 
anahtar tutarak sağlayabilmekteyiz. Şemamızın performansını paylaşılan anahtar keşfi 
evresinden sonraki temel şema [4] ile karşılaştırdık ve sonuçlarımız gösteriyor ki 
şemamız, temel şema ile aynı yerel bağlantıyı elde etmektedir. Daha fazlası, bunu 
yaparken şemamızdaki düğümler, temel şemadaki düğümlerden dörtte üç oranında daha 
az anahtar ile yüklenmektedir. Ayrıca şemamız, düğüm ele geçirme saldırılarında 
paylaşılan anahtar keşfi evreli temel şemadan %50’ye kadar daha dayanıklı kalmaktadır. 
Önerdiğimiz son şema çoklu evreli kablosuz duyarga ağlarında kullanılmak üzere 
tasarlanmıştır. Tasarımımızda düğümler, ölenlerin yerini almak üzere nesil adı verilen 
zaman aralıklarının başında yerleştirilirler. Her neslin kendisine ait tamamen farklı bir 
anahtar havuzu vardır. Farklı nesillere ait havuzlardan rastgele seçilmiş anahtarlar 
düğümlere, o nesillerde yerleştirilmiş düğümlerle güvenli iletişim kurabilmeleri için 
önceden yüklenir. Başka bir deyişle, şemamızda anahtarlar nesil çiftlerine özgüdür. Bu 
saldırganın işini zorlaştırır ve şemamızın dayanıklılığını artırır. Şemamızı çoklu evreli 
kablosuz duyarga ağları için tasarlanmış başka bir anahtar ön dağıtım şemasıyla 
karşılaştırdık. Sonuçlarımız gösterdi ki, şemamız yoğun saldırılarda bile kararlı 
durumdayken %35’e kadar daha dayanıklıdır. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless sensor networks [2] gained importance in the last decade due to 
widespread application areas from environmental monitoring to medical use, and from 
object tracking to military fields. The critical usage areas of sensor networks also 
provide point of attraction for researchers. Wireless sensor networks are composed of 
battery powered, small and resource constrained devices called sensor nodes. Sensor 
nodes are capable of collecting environmental information such as temperature, 
humidity, and light conditions. Moreover, they can process and store data, both in a 
limited way, and have short-range radio communication capabilities with integrated 
sensors. Although they are often called as mobile devices, once they are deployed in a 
field, most of the time they carry out their operation at the same position till their 
batteries are depleted. Hence, they usually have permanent set of neighbors. But in real 
life scenarios, the exact position of a node cannot be determined prior to deployment, 
because their deployment methods are arbitrary. 
There exist some potential security risks in wireless sensor networks when they 
carry critical data. Sensors communicate via air. Wireless nature of communication 
provides some advantages to an intruder compared to wired communication. Intruder 
can surreptitiously listen to communication between sensors without being noticed. 
Another risk is caused by unconfined sensors in the field. When sensors are used in 
military fields, one cannot easily control them; they become open to physical attacks, 
such as impersonation and capture, by enemies. These problems are addressed in [3]. 
Due to known security problems encountered in wireless sensor networks, 
security mechanisms, such as encryption and authentication, should be maintained to 
overcome these threats. However, integration of security mechanisms into wireless 
sensor networks is not as intuitive as it is thought to be in the first sight because of 
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resource constraints of the nodes. Wireless sensor networks are usually lack of network 
topology information prior to deployment and they are formed by non-hierarchical 
sensor nodes. Unknown infrastructure and unreliable deployment zone make trusted 
third party solutions such as Kerberos [23] almost inapplicable for wireless sensor 
networks. Besides, key agreement solutions using public key cryptography such as, 
Diffie-Hellman [24], is also infeasible for wireless sensor networks that consist of 
sensor nodes with weak CPUs which are lack of capability of processing expensive 
public key encryption and decryption operations. Also energy consumption of public 
key encryption and decryption operations is too much for battery-operated devices and 
that shortens the life-time. 
The remaining solution is conventional symmetric key encryption which does not 
require too much computational power and energy. Symmetric key cryptography is 
more CPU-efficient than public key cryptography and can be performed even by sensor 
nodes. On the other hand, even though data from sensor nodes is sent to the sink node 
most of the time, it is sometimes needed to be processed (e.g. aggregated) by the 
intermediate nodes along the path. Necessity of processing data in node-to-node basis 
requires security in link level. For this reason, symmetric keys are supposed to be 
distributed in link level instead of end-to-end (e.g. node-to-sink) fashion. 
Symmetric key cryptography requires both ends of communication to share a 
secret key. Here, the main challenge is distribution of keying material in a secure way 
among the sensor nodes. Many research efforts have been spent to address this 
challenge. The best solution that survived is key predistribution prior to deployment.  
In the literature, the problem of key distribution in wireless sensor networks is 
addressed by several probabilistic key predistribution schemes such as [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. 
One of the earliest approaches is proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [4]. In 
Eschenauer-Gligor’s basic scheme, there is a global key pool of size P, this key pool 
contains symmetric keys and their unique key identifiers. k (k << P) keys are uniform 
randomly chosen from this key pool without replacement for each sensor node. These 
keys form the node’s keyring to be stored in its memory. This phase is called key 
predistribution phase. After deployment, nodes broadcast identifiers of the keys in their 
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keyring. A node receiving these signals finds out which nodes are in its neighborhood as 
well as their keyring content. Since the keyrings of these nodes are produced from the 
same key pool, they share a common key with a certain probability. If there is a shared 
key between neighboring node pairs, this key is used to secure their communication. 
This phase is called shared-key discovery phase. 
Eschenauer and Gligor [4] have also proposed a third phase for their basic 
scheme. This phase is called path-key establishment phase. If two neighbor nodes, a and 
b do not have a common key, they can try to find an intermediate node c such that a and 
b are both neighbors of c and they have previously established a secure link with c by 
sharing a predistributed key. One of the neighbor nodes, say a, generates a path-key and 
sends it to intermediate node c which will forward the path-key to b. The generated key 
is not compromised along the way, because it is sent over secure channels between 
uncompromised nodes all the time.  
1.1.  Contribution of the Thesis 
In this thesis, we proposed three key predistribution schemes. Most of the works 
in the literature are compared to basic scheme, because it is one of the first key 
predistribution schemes and it is basis to the others. So we did compare first two of our 
proposed schemes with basic scheme. The first scheme consists of three phases. These 
phases are: (i) key predistribution phase, (ii) shared-key discovery phase and (iii) 
transfer phase. Our scheme differentiates from most of the key predistribution schemes 
with an important feature, which is the XORed key. XORed keys are bitwise XOR of 
two regular keys (will be called as single keys). Keyrings of nodes in this proposed 
scheme contain a mixture of XORed and single keys. 
Neighboring sensor nodes try to find a shared XORed key in their keyring in the 
first place. If they cannot find a common XORed key, they try to find a shared single 
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key in their keyring. If both of these attempts fail, they transfer keys from their secure 
neighbors. The transferred keys are mostly single keys and nodes XOR transferred 
single keys in a couple of ways to produce an XORed key which is already found in the 
keyring of other neighboring party. 
Our scheme increases the connectivity of basic scheme while keeping sizes of 
keyring and key pool fixed. Moreover instead of using single keys for securing 
communications, we encourage the usage of XORed keys, if available. This property 
constitutes the main frame of the scheme. XORed keys are used for the purpose of 
increasing resilience of the network, since an attacker has to compromise either both 
operand single keys used in an XORed key or the XORed key itself to capture a 
communication link. With a careful setting of the numbers of single keys and XORed 
keys in the keyrings (70 single keys / 30 XORed keys), local connectivity performance 
of our scheme increases up to 50% of connectivity achieved in basic scheme [4] and it 
slightly approaches 1.0 value. Resiliency metric in our scheme stays below that of the 
basic scheme up to the point where fraction of communications compromised reaches 
0.6. 
The second scheme that we proposed has a new improvement to basic scheme that 
does not require intermediate nodes to transfer the generated key. Again a and b are two 
neighboring nodes and suppose they do not have a shared key. One of the neighbor 
nodes, for instance a, looks for another neighbor node c which has already established 
secure link with a and share a common key with b. a asks c for transferring that 
common key directly to itself. Moreover c does not need to be neighbor with both of a 
and b as opposed to path-key establishment phase.  
Our scheme consists of three primary phases akin to previous phase. These phases 
are: (i) key predistribution phase, (ii) shared-key discovery phase and (iii) transfer 
phase. First two phases are exactly same as the corresponding phases in basic scheme. 
Our contribution to basic scheme is in the transfer phase. Performance of our scheme is 
compared with basic scheme [4] after shared-key discovery phase and after path-key 
establishment phase separately. Our scheme achieves the same local connectivity with 
significantly fewer keys as compared to abovementioned phases. The keyring size of 
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nodes in our scheme is 4-fold smaller than the keyring size of nodes in basic scheme 
after shared-key discovery phase to achieve full connectivity. The keyring size of nodes 
in our scheme is also smaller than the keyring size of nodes in basic scheme after path-
key establishment phase to achieve almost 1.0 local connectivity. Moreover the 
difference in fraction of communications compromised between our scheme and basic 
scheme after shared-key discovery phase increases up to 50% with abovementioned 
keyring sizes. Also we achieve the same resiliency performance with basic scheme after 
path-key establishment phase with smaller keyring size and same local connectivity. 
As it is mentioned, sensor nodes are battery powered and they eventually go out 
of battery. However, WSNs should function for long periods. Therefore, as the nodes 
die, new nodes should be deployed in certain intervals, called generations, during 
operation of the network. This kind of WSNs is called multi-phase wireless sensor 
networks. Most of the key distribution studies in the literature are designed for single-
phase wireless sensor networks. Even if some of these studies suggest dynamic node 
additions to the network, the key pools in these schemes contain static keys that do not 
change in redeployments. As a result, if the network encounters a long term attack and 
new nodes are added to the system dynamically after this attack, they will be integrated 
to the network with some already compromised keys in their keyrings. If the attacker 
continues his/her attack by capturing nodes and acquiring the keyrings of captured 
nodes, he/she will eventually discover all of the key pool and the network would totally 
collapse. However, periodic redeployments in multi-phase sensor networks present an 
important opportunity to reduce the effect of an attacker. In each redeployment, a fresh 
set of keys may be deployed. Thus after a temporary attack, key pool can recover itself 
and remove the effects of the compromised keys. In addition, in case of a continuous 
attack, key pool can keep the rate of damage within a certain level. In such schemes, the 
connectivity among the nodes in different deployment generations should also be 
sustained. There is limited work done in the literature about key distribution in multi-
phase sensor networks. One of them, RoK scheme [9], is explained in the next section 
in detail. 
As the last scheme, we propose a novel random key predistribution scheme for 
multi-phase wireless sensor networks which is called RGM (Random Generation 
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Material) scheme [1]. In our RGM scheme, each generation of deployment has its own 
random keying material. During shared-key discovery, unique pairwise keys are 
established between node pairs of particular generations. Here by uniqueness, we mean 
that nodes of other generations cannot know these keys. Therefore, a captured node 
cannot be used to obtain keys of other generations. This significantly improves the 
resiliency of RGM. We conducted simulative performance analyses and compared 
RGM scheme with RoK [9]. Our analyses show that RGM scheme is up to three-fold 
more resilient to node capture attacks as compared to RoK scheme. We also show that 
under heavy attacks, RoK scheme reveals 35% more secure link keys as compared to 
our RGM scheme. Moreover, with keyring size of 500 keys, our scheme provides 90% 
local connectivity, which is more than sufficient for a wireless sensor network. 
1.2.  Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of this thesis is organized as the following. Section 2 gives general 
background information on key predistribution in wireless sensor networks and 
previous works in the literature. It also describes key predistribution schemes designed 
for more specialized wireless sensor networks. Sections 3, 4, and 5 are dedicated to 
three proposed schemes which are briefly mentioned above. Subsection organizations of 
3, 4, and 5 are will be separately presented in the beginning of each section. Section 6 
concludes the thesis. 
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2. LITERATURE ON KEY DISTRIBUTION IN WIRELESS SENSOR 
NETWORKS 
There are two naïve solutions for distributing symmetric keys prior to deployment 
in wireless sensor networks. These are master key and pair-wise key methods. The first 
one is using a master key which all the nodes in the network share. The nodes use this 
master key to produce link keys. However, this method is very weak in terms of 
resilience. Capture of one node leads to the compromise of whole network. In the 
second method, each node keeps a unique key for every other node. This method gives 
the best resilience. The problem in this method is limited storage capacity of the sensor 
nodes. One node has to store n - 1 symmetric keys in its data memory, where n is the 
number of nodes in the network. That is why the network should be very small. 
Although both of these methods provide full connectivity in the network, their negative 
effects or inabilities of sensor nodes cause researchers to find new methods. One 
approach is using hybrid of these two naïve methods. In this approach, two nodes share 
a key with a probability. Thus, there is no guarantee that two nodes share a key. In the 
same way, an attacker can acquire a small portion of keys when a node is captured. This 
type of schemes creates a trade-off between local connectivity and resilience. Local 
connectivity is the probability of two neighboring nodes to share at least one common 
key. Resilience is the portion of indirectly compromised links over all links at the end of 
a successful attack of node captures. Indirectly compromised link is a link whose keys 
are known by the attacker, but none of the sensors in both ends is captured. 
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2.1.  Key Predistribution for Single-Phase Wireless Sensor Networks 
Research efforts on key predistribution have been concentrated on probabilistic 
key predistribution. They renounce connectivity in order to make network more 
resistant to attacks. In probabilistic key predistribution approaches, there is a pool which 
contains symmetric keys and their unique key identifiers. A number of keys are drawn 
without replacement for each sensor node and these keys are loaded into memory of the 
nodes prior to deployment. These keys form keyring of a sensor node. After 
deployment, two nodes can establish a secure connection if they have at least one shared 
key in their keyrings. 
One of the earliest probabilistic key predistribution approaches is proposed by 
Eschenauer and Gligor [4] and this is also called the basic scheme. Basic scheme is 
composed of three phases: (i) key predistribution, (ii) shared-key discovery, and (iii) 
path-key establishment phases. In key predistribution phase, k keys are randomly drawn 
from a key pool of size P, where , for each sensor node. These keys are loaded 
into data memory of sensor nodes prior to deployment. In this way each node forms its 
keyring. 
Shared-key discovery phase starts after all sensor nodes are deployed and they 
discover neighbor nodes in their communication range. After deployment, nodes 
broadcast identifiers of the keys in their keyring. A node receiving these signals 
understands which nodes are in neighborhood as well as their keyring content. Since all 
keys are drawn from the same pool, two neighbor sensor nodes share a common key 
with a certain probability. This probability depends on the sizes of key pool and 
keyring. In other words, connectivity is directly proportional to keyring size and 
inversely proportional to key pool size. In this phase, all the nodes try to find a key 
shared between their neighbors. If there is such a key, it is used to secure 
communication between those two; otherwise, they run path-key establishment phase in 
which common secure neighbors help in key establishment. 
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In the path-key establishment phase, if two neighbor nodes, n1 and n2 do not have 
a common key, they can try to find an intermediate node i1 in key sharing graph such 
that n1 and n2 are both neighbors of i1 and they have previously established a secure link 
with i1 by sharing a predistributed key. As long as the key sharing graph is connected, 
there is always a path from n1 to n2. Definition of key sharing graph is as follows. 
Suppose, V is the set of all nodes in the network. For any two nodes a and b in V, there 
exists an edge between them if and only if a and b have at least one shared key and they 
are in their radio communication range. One of the neighbor nodes, say n1, will generate 
a key and send it to intermediate node i1 which will forward it to n2. The generated key 
is not compromised in this way, because it is sent over secure channels all the time. This 
is one-hop version of path-key establishment and it can also be generalized to t-hop 
versions that are using t intermediate nodes instead of one. In this way, generated key 
has to travel all along the nodes n1, i1, i2, …, it, n2. This extension may work for 
increasing connectivity; however it may also bring the burden of communication cost. 
The communication cost increases relative to the length of this multi-hop path. 
In the basic scheme, it is likely that a particular key exists in several nodes' 
keyrings. This is actually a necessity, because otherwise local connectivity reduces. 
However, having multiple copies of a key is also a potential security problem. An 
attacker can capture some nodes and acquire their keyrings. Established links secured 
by using the same keys in acquired keyrings are automatically compromised by the 
attacker. This weakens the resilience of the network against node capture attacks. 
Eschenauer and Gligor’s basic scheme is also a framework for our first two 
proposed schemes. Our schemes improve the resilience and connectivity of the basic 
scheme. 
Chan et al. [7] proposed another scheme called q-composite scheme to increase 
the resistance of basic scheme. Instead of using only one shared key, Chan et al. offered 
using two or more shared keys. It is known that using q (q > 1) keys instead of one key 
increase resilience of the network since attacker needs to capture more than one key to 
compromise a link. In this way, they achieve more durable system against attacks. Chan 
et al. also proposed an alternative scheme that uses a threshold number of shared keys to 
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establish a secure link. In other words, two neighbor nodes should have at least some 
number of shared keys, defined by threshold parameter, to create a secure link. This 
additional feature can lower connectivity value, but in some conditions it is preferable 
to have a robust and resilient system rather than a connected one. 
Chan et al.’s q-composite scheme has also some similarities with two of our 
schemes proposed in Section 3 and 5, because in our schemes, nodes require more than 
one key to secure their communication. But q-composite scheme does not have a 
transfer phase which gives great advance in connectivity of the network as in the 
scheme proposed in Section 3 of the thesis. Moreover, it is not specifically designed for 
multi-phase wireless sensor networks as in RGM scheme [1] proposed in Section 5 of 
the thesis. 
Differing from probabilistic schemes, in [10], Blom proposed a multipurpose 
deterministic key predistribution scheme which uses single key space. Each node is able 
to calculate a pairwise key by storing only  keys in a network of size N . 
Compared to the naïve pair-wise scheme in which each node stores N keys, it is highly 
applicable to wireless sensor networks. In this scheme, there is a property that an 
attacker cannot compromise any link unless no more than  nodes have been captured. 
Besides, if  nodes have been captured, whole system gets compromised. This is called 
-secure property. 
Du et al. [5] further improved Blom’s scheme and transformed it to a general 
probabilistic case that is directly applicable to WSNs. Despite Blom’s single key space, 
Du et al.’s scheme uses a multiple key space approach. This scheme has similar phases 
with basic scheme. When  parameter is equal to 0, it is reduced to basic scheme. 
Basic scheme can be thought as a special case of Du et al.’s scheme in this aspect. In 
key predistribution phase,  different key spaces are drawn for each node from a key 
space pool. After deployment of nodes and discovering neighbors, shared key space 
discovery starts and if any two nodes share information from the same key space, they 
can secure their communication link using this key space material. As in basic scheme, 
Du et al.’s scheme starts path-key space discovery phase in case of absence of shared-
key space. 
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This modification in Du et al.’s scheme converts Blom’s scheme to probabilistic 
key distribution scheme from pair-wise key distribution scheme. The idea behind using 
multiple key spaces instead of single key space is to make it more resilient than Blom’s 
scheme. If an attacker compromises  nodes, he/she does not certainly capture a key 
space, because all of the  compromised nodes do not possibly share the same key 
space. 
Du et al. [6] extended their scheme by integrating deployment awareness. This 
information is very valuable if it is known beforehand. Keys can be distributed using 
some heuristics that close neighbors have more shared keys than further neighbors. As a 
result, connectivity would have been dramatically increased. 
Du et al.’s scheme with deployment knowledge [6] differs from their previous 
scheme [5] by key predistribution phase. Other phases are totally same as [5]. The 
scheme proposed in [6] leverages group based deployment model as deployment pattern 
of sensor nodes. In this model, a total of N sensor nodes are split into t x n groups 
containing the same amount of nodes. Each group of node is deployed in a geographical 
zone. Zones are designed as a grid. Hence, neighboring relations are provided in group 
basis. 
It will be useful to mention about key space predistribution phase of [6] as it is 
different than [5]. In key space predistribution phase, not only sensor nodes but key 
space pools are split into groups. Neighboring groups are defined as groups laying close 
to each other geographically. Purpose of this phase is letting key space pools used by 
neighboring groups contain more shared keys and key space pools used by further 
groups contain fewer shared keys. After key space pools are arranged,  key spaces are 
drawn uniformly random without replacement for each sensor node from their own key 
space pool. So, it is provided that sensor node pairs that are highly probable to be 
neighbors after deployment have more shared key spaces.  
There are lots of works in the general literature of key management in sensor 
networks. Camtepe and Yener [3], Zhang and Varadharajan [11], Zhou et al. [12], Lee 
et al. [13] and Xiao et al. [14] provide good surveys and taxonomy about them. In all 
random key predistribution schemes, there is a trade-off between local connectivity and 
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resiliency against node capture attacks. Having a large keyring size increases the 
probability of direct key sharing (local connectivity), but this also gives more keys to 
the attacker when a node is captured. 
2.2.  Key Predistribution for Multi-Phase Wireless Sensor Networks 
Sensor nodes operate using battery power that eventually depletes. Wireless 
sensor networks are set up to function for longer period of time as compared to the 
lifetime of sensor nodes. So, new nodes need to be deployed in some intervals to 
provide continuity of network. Such wireless sensor networks are called multi-phase 
wireless sensor networks. The intervals at which new nodes are deployed are called 
generations. In the beginning of each generation, dead nodes are replaced by fresh 
nodes.  
Castelluccia and Spognardi [9] proposed a key management scheme called Robust 
Key Distribution (RoK) for multi-phase wireless sensor networks, in which 
predistributed keys have limited lifetimes. This is achieved by refreshing key pools for 
each generation of deployment. Refreshed key pools allow a network that is temporarily 
attacked to be self-healed in time. 
If key pool is refreshed with random keys in each deployment, attacker cannot 
guess the upcoming pool by knowing previous keys or cannot learn former pools by 
knowing current one. However, in the same way, sensor nodes deployed at different 
generations cannot establish secure links. In order to achieve connectivity between 
nodes belonging to different generations, there should be some kind of relation between 
key pools at different generations. 
RoK uses two key pools: forward and backward key pools, FKP and BKP. In 
order to provide connectivity between different generations, FKP is updated by hashing 
keys of previous generation and BKP is generated using Lamport hash chains [15]. 
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Lamport hash chain is successive calculations of cryptographic hash function in order to 
produce one-time keys. Each key is derived from a hash function which takes next one-
time key as an input. 
Table 2.1 gives the symbols used in the explanations of RoK scheme. The same 
symbol table will be referred for the explanation of our proposed RGM scheme, which 
will be given in Section 5. 
Table 2.1. Symbols used in RoK and RGM 
 Forward key pool at generation j in RoK scheme 
 Backward key pool at generation j in RoK scheme 
 Generation key pool of generation j in RGM scheme 
 Key pool size 
 Forward keyring of node A deployed at generation j in RoK scheme 
 Backward keyring of node A deployed at generation j in RoK scheme 
 Generation keyring of node A deployed at generation g in RGM scheme 
 
Generation sub-keyring of node A deployed at generation f containing keys used to 
establish link with nodes deployed at generation g in RGM scheme. If g > f, then it is 
future generation sub-keyring. If g = f, then it is same generation sub-keyring. 
 
Forward key with index t at generation j in RoK scheme 
 
Backward key with index t at generation j in RoK scheme 
 Generation key with index t to be used between the nodes deployed at the same generation f in RGM scheme 
 
Generation key with index t to be used between the nodes deployed at generations f and 
g in RGM scheme 
 
Link key between nodes A and B 
 
Generation window 
 
Hash function that generates a non-repeating random number sequence to be used by 
RoK scheme. Each generated random number is in range. 
 Secure hash function  
 Number of current generation keys in a generation keyring 
 Number of future generation keys in a generation keyring for each next generation 
 Key sharing probability of neighboring node pairs deployed at the same generation 
 Key sharing probability of neighboring node pairs deployed at different generations 
 
In RoK, the forward key pool at generation j is denoted as follows.  
 , where P is the pool size.     (2.1)  
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The forward key pool at generation  is denoted as follows. 
, where .   (2.2)  
 
Similarly, the backward key pool at generation j is denoted as  
 , where P is the pool size.    (2.3)  
 
The backward key pool at generation  is denoted as follows. 
 , where .   (2.4)  
It is assumed that each node has an upper bound of lifetime and this upper bound 
defines generation window, , which is a system parameter. A node may live at most 
as long as this generation window. A node A deployed at generation j is given two 
keyrings, forward keyring and backward keyring. Forward keyring, , consists of 
forward keys of generation j drawn randomly from forward key pool at generation j, 
. Backward keyring, , consists of backward keys of generation  
drawn randomly from backward key pool at generation , .  These 
keyrings are formally shown below. 
     (2.5) 
    (2.6) 
Node A can produce a forward key  if and backward key  if 
. Each node, deployed at generation j, have certain probability to share a 
common key with another node B which is deployed at generation i, where i is in 
interval . The generations between which two nodes can produce the 
same forward and backward keys are called overlapping generations. Let’s suppose 
, then their overlapping generations would be between j and . If nodes A 
and B have common keys of indices , they compute their link key as the 
following. 
, where . (2.7)  
Forward keys provide forward secrecy since the attacker cannot learn previous 
keys even if it learns a forward key at a generation. Similarly, backward keys provide 
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backward secrecy since the attacker cannot learn future keys even if it learns a 
backward key at a generation. When an attacker learns some forward and backward 
keys by capturing a sensor node, previous forward keys are not revealed since a forward 
key is calculated from previous forward key by a one-way hash function. Similarly, 
future backward keys are also protected. Sensor nodes cannot find out these previous 
forward keys and future backward keys even if they keep keys of same index in their 
keyrings. This property provides a lifetime to the keyring. The lifetime of a keyring also 
limits the capability of an attacker. He/she can use a compromised keyring for a short 
period of time. Since the keyrings have limited lifetime and key pools are refreshed 
periodically, compromised keys automatically expire like all the other keys as time 
passes. In this way, network gradually removes the traces of an attack and heals itself. If 
this attack is of temporary type, in a certain time network comes to the state before the 
attack has started. If it is a permanent type of an attack, network can keep the ratio of 
corrupted links within a certain limit. 
There are a handful of works in the literature for key distribution in multiphase 
sensor networks that improves the RoK scheme [9]. Yilmaz et al. [16] leveraged 
generation time presented by RoK. They deployed nodes pre-loaded with keys 
belonging to future generations earlier; so that they reduced the period an adversary 
make use of compromised keys. Besides, there may be some discontinuity between the 
keyrings of sensor nodes as nodes of future generations are deployed earlier. Actually, 
they made a trade-off between resiliency and connectivity. Furthermore, Kalkan et al. 
[17] adjoined multiphase key predistribution scheme in RoK [9] scheme to deployment 
awareness discussed in [6]. They improved resiliency by leveraging deployment 
knowledge in key predistribution. Our RGM [1] scheme removed forward and 
backward key pools and reinvented a new key pool, which is called generation key pool. 
Unlike RoK scheme, there is no relationship between subsequent states of generation 
key pool. On the other hand, in RGM scheme, continuity between nodes at different 
generations is provided by giving each node keying material from key pools of other 
generations. Resiliency performance of RGM scheme is significantly better than RoK 
scheme with relatively small degradation in local connectivity. 
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3. A PROBABILISTIC KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SCHEME BASED ON 
XORED KEYING MATERIAL 
In this section a random key predistribution scheme for wireless sensor networks 
is proposed. In this scheme, we use a novel key type called XORed key, which is 
bitwise XOR of two regular keys. In order to differentiate XORed and regular keys, we 
rename regular keys as single keys throughout this section. Our scheme uses a 
combination of XORed and single keys in the keyrings of sensor nodes. Since XORed 
keys are produced using two single keys, a secured link established using XORed keys 
is more resistant to attacks.  
Our scheme also has a phase called transfer phase which increases the local 
connectivity of the network by transferring keys from secure neighbors in required 
conditions. Furthermore, transferred keys are not used directly, instead their XORed 
forms are used. In other words, keys are transferred to complete missing operands of 
XORed keys in the keyring. 
As in Chan et al.’s scheme [7], our scheme uses two single keys contributed in the 
establishment of link key. However, in our scheme, keyrings of nodes are composed of 
variety of XORed and single keys, contrary to the homogeneous structure of keyrings in 
Chan et al.’s scheme [7]. Nodes XOR two single key operands or use XORed key in 
their keyring directly in order to secure their communications. 
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Table 3.1. List of symbols used in this section 
 Key pool of single keys 
 Key pool of XORed keys 
 XORed keyring of node  
 Single keyring of node  
 Global single key pool size 
 Global XORed key pool size 
 Keyring size 
 Single keyring size 
 XORed keyring size 
 Set of all nodes 
 List of neighbors of node  
 List of neighbors of node  with at least one shared key 
 Number of neighbors in communication range 
 A sends key to B in a secure way 
 
The rest of this section is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes the proposed 
scheme. Section 3.2 explains performance metrics and gives comparative simulation 
results. The running times of the methods are given in Section 3.3. Final discussions and 
conclusions are made in Section 3.4. 
3.1.  Our Contribution 
Our scheme is based on probabilistic key predistribution, like basic scheme [4]. It 
includes three main phases which are (i) key predistribution, (ii) shared-key discovery, 
and (iii) key transfer phases. Although key predistribution and shared-key discovery 
phases in our scheme have similar characteristics with corresponding phases of the 
basic scheme, our scheme differs from basic scheme with one important feature, which 
is the keying material. There are two types of keys stored in the keyrings of nodes. 
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Transfer phase is a novel phase in our scheme. In this phase, some manipulations are 
performed to improve the local connectivity of the proposed scheme. 
Workflow of abovementioned phases are shown in Figure 3.1. Key predistribution 
phase and shared-key discovery phase are split into two parts as single key and XORed 
key subphases since the key types involved are different. 
 
 Figure 3.1. Workflow of the proposed scheme 
3.1.1.  Key Predistribution 
Key predistribution phase starts with offline generation of a large single key pool 
of  keys. Each single key is assigned a unique key identifier. In addition to that, 
XORed key pool, which is composed of keys obtained by XORing distinct single keys 
in single key pool, is prepared automatically. The total number of XORed keys derived 
by XORing single keys is the number of binary combinations of all single keys in the 
single key pool. Thus, the size of the XORed key pool is the following: 
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      (3.1) 
Key identifier of an XORed key x is defined as , where i and j are key 
identifiers of corresponding single keys from which x is derived. 
 single keys from SP are drawn uniformly random without replacement for 
each node to form single keyrings. After this process, XORed keyrings of sensor nodes 
are established by selecting  XORed keys from XORed key pool XP for each node 
uniformly random without replacement. If one of the single key operands of a selected 
XORed key is already in the single keyring of the node, selected XORed key is ignored 
and new one is drawn. Thus, the node can derive as many new XORed keys as possible 
from available single keys in its keyring. We will explain the reason why the nodes 
need to produce XORed keys from the single keys in their keyrings in shared-key 
discovery phase. Total keyring memory size of sensor nodes is the sum of single 
keyring size and XORed keyring size as given in Equation 3.2. 
         (3.2) 
3.1.2.  Shared-Key Discovery 
 After key predistribution phase is completed, sensor nodes with preloaded 
keyrings in memory are deployed in the field. After settlement, nodes scan their 
neighborhood independently. Each sensor node broadcasts node identity and the 
identifiers of single and XORed keys they have. At the end of transmission of own key 
identifiers and reception of respective keyring contents in the neighborhood, nodes try 
to find common XORed keys with their neighbor nodes in the first step. If no common 
XORed key with a neighbor is found, corresponding node tries to find a common single 
key.  
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The reason behind searching for XORed keys initially is that resiliency of an 
XORed key is more than a resiliency of a single key. An attacker has to obtain two 
operands of an XORed key in order to capture a link secured by that XORed key, while 
it is enough to capture just one single key in single link key case. In our scheme using 
XORed key as a link key is promoted; if there is a chance to use XORed key or single 
key to secure a link, XORed key usage is preferred. However, we should admit that it is 
harder to find out a shared XORed key in keyrings of neighboring nodes, because the 
size of XORed key pool is much larger than the size of single key pool. This reduces the 
probability of an XORed key to be shared by any two nodes. 
If both of these attempts fail, nodes try to derive new XORed keys using single 
keys pre-loaded in their memory. A node XORs two single keys in its single keyring to 
match an XORed key in the XORed keyring of its neighbor. For example, suppose a 
and b are two neighbors with no secure link yet established. If node a has single keys t 
and u in its keyring such that  and x is in b’s XORed keyring, then a XORs t 
and u to obtain x and the nodes a and b can use x to establish a secure link. If 
neighboring nodes still cannot find a common key, they start key transfer phase which is 
described in the next subsection. 
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Figure 3.2. Pseudo-code of shared-key discovery phase. 
The algorithm of shared-key discovery phase is depicted in Figure 3.2. In this 
figure, it is shown that for each neighboring node a and b, if they have at least one 
shared XORed key x in their XORed keyring, they establish secure link by using this 
key. If they fail to find a shared XORed key, they search for a shared single key. If they 
find at least one shared single key s, they establish secure link by using this key. If a 
secure link is established in one of these ways, a and b add each other to their secure 
neighbor list. 
In the second loop of the algorithm in Figure 3.2, neighboring nodes, which do 
not have any common XORed or single key, XOR single keys in their keyring to 
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produce an XORed key that is found in the keyrings of their neighbors. If there is a 
match, they use this XORed key in their communication. 
3.1.3.  Key Transfer 
Main contribution of our scheme is in the key transfer phase. When shared-key 
discovery phase ends, there would possibly be some neighboring nodes that failed on 
finding common key and some succeeded on setting up secure communication links. 
Successfully established secure links are used to help creating secure links between 
insecure neighbor nodes in key transfer phase. 
If two neighboring nodes a and b cannot establish a secure link in shared-key 
discovery phase, they apply a number of methods that will help them to agree on a key.  
In the first method, a node searches its own single keyring and the single keyrings 
of its neighbors with which they have a secure communication link (from now on 
mentioned as direct secure neighbor). If there are two single keys, one in its single 
keyring and one in its secure neighbor’s single keyring, such that XOR of these single 
keys matches an XORed key in its unsecure neighbor’s XORed keyring, it transfers the 
single key from its direct secure neighbor and establishes communication with its 
unsecure neighbor using XOR of those single keys. For example, suppose b has the 
XORed key  in its XORed keyring , and one of its operands  is found in 
node , the other operand  is found in direct secure neighbor node  of . In this 
method,  transfers the single key  from node  and XORs it with its single key . In 
this way, it obtains a new XORed key  which  shares with . For this operation, 
node  needs to seek the identifiers of the single keys in direct secure neighbors’ single 
keyrings. These key identifiers are already supplied in shared-key discovery phase, so 
there is no need to resend them in this phase. Since there is no extra messages sent 
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through nodes, this method (and also the upcoming methods) has minimal effect on 
communication cost. Algorithm for this method is given in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3. Method 1, nodes try to transfer single keys from their direct secure 
neighbors and XOR them with existing single keys in their keyring to produce an 
XORed key that is found in the keyrings of their neighbors. 
If the first method does not work, the nodes use the second method. In method 2, 
a node transfers an XORed key from its direct secure neighbor, and XOR the transferred 
key with another XORed key in its keyring to derive a new XORed key that can be used 
for securing a communication link. In order to derive a new XORed key, transferred 
XORed key and existing XORed key in the keyring should have one common operand; 
when two XORed keys are XORed, this common operand cancels out and new XORed 
key becomes XOR of two single keys. For instance, suppose nodes  and  are two 
neighboring nodes with no shared key and node  is ’s direct secure neighbor.  has 
an XORed key  and  has an XORed key  in their XORed keyrings such that  
and  have a common single key operand. Furthermore, XOR of  and  produces 
another XORed key which is found in the XORed keyring of node . In this condition, 
 transfers  from  and creates XOR of  and . Afterwards nodes  and  
establish secure link using this XORed key. Algorithm for method 2 is given in Figure 
3.4. 
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Figure 3.4. Method 2, nodes try to transfer XORed keys from their direct secure 
neighbors and XOR them with existing XORed keys in their keyring also to produce an 
XORed key that is found in the keyrings of their neighbors. 
If the previous methods do not help to establish a secure link, as the last chance, 
the nodes try method 3. In this method, a node searches for two single keys from 
distinct direct secure neighbors, transfer and XOR them to obtain a new XORed key. If 
this new XORed key is also found in the XORed keyring of the neighbor node with 
which the node wants to establish a secure link, then this secure link is created. 
Transferred XORed keys should have one common operand again for the reasons 
mentioned above. For example, suppose nodes  and  are direct secure neighbor of  
and  and  are two neighboring nodes that do not have a shared key.  has a single 
key  and  has a single key  such that their XOR produces a new XORed key which 
also exists in the node ’s XORed keyring.  requests to transfer single keys  and  
from direct secure neighbors  and  and upon receipt  XORs these two single keys 
and produces the XORed key which is common with . Then, they establish secure 
link. Algorithm of this method is given Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5. Method 3, nodes try to transfer two single keys from two distinct direct 
secure neighbors and XOR them in order to produce an XORed key that is found in the 
keyrings of their neighbors. 
If a node runs these methods in the transfer phase and establishes new secure 
communication links with neighbor nodes, it adds these nodes into its direct neighbors 
list and to re-runs these methods for the purpose of deriving new common keys with the 
neighbors that do not share one. This provides an additional optimization to transfer 
phase, and it incrementally improves local connectivity. 
3.2.  Performance Evaluations 
For the performance evaluation of the proposed scheme, we conduct simulations. 
The simulations are done in MATLAB environment in a 2.4 GHz Intel Core 2 Quad 
desktop PC running 32-bit Windows Vista and 64-bit Linux operating systems. In 
simulations, 10000 nodes are uniformly random distributed in a square field of size 
1000 m  1000 m. Nodes can communicate with others in an area of 40 m radius. In 
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this configuration, average number of neighbors becomes 48.64 nodes. Single key pool 
size is 10000 keys. Thus, XORed key pool size automatically becomes 49,995,000 keys, 
although this key pool is not actually generated. 
Local connectivity is the probability that any two sensor nodes share at least one 
key. In Figure 3.6, basic scheme line indicates the local connectivity of basic scheme [4] 
with 100 single keys. This line serves as a performance threshold to our scheme. For our 
scheme, single keyring sizes increase by 10 keys, while XORed keyring sizes decrease 
by 10 keys such that single keyring and XORed keyring sizes add up to 100 keys. When 
single keyring size is small, local connectivity of our scheme is lower than the basic 
scheme. The reason is that probability of sharing at least one XORed key is so small as 
the XORed key pool is huge in practice. As the single keyring size increases and 
XORed keyring size reduces, the local connectivity of our scheme increases and 
eventually exceeds the basic scheme threshold. The highest connectivity of our scheme 
occurs when 70 single keys and 30 XORed keys are used. At this point, local 
connectivity value of our scheme is 0.97; whereas the local connectivity of basic 
scheme with 100 keys is 0.63. This result shows that our scheme provides almost full 
connectivity when the keyring size ratio is selected appropriately. 
 
Figure 3.6. Local connectivity of our scheme compared to basic scheme 
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Figure 3.7. Number of times the nodes make use of transfer methods in transfer phase as 
a whole (units in vertical axis are multiples of 104). 
Figure 3.7 is the graph of number of times transfer methods are used to establish a 
secure link versus number of keys in single and XORed keyrings of the nodes. Units in 
the vertical axis are multiples of 104. As shown in Figure 3.7, the greatest benefit of our 
key transfer phase is obtained when there are 50 single keys and 50 XORed keys in 
corresponding keyrings. In this distribution, more than 160,000 links are established 
securely by our transfer methods. In the figure it is seen that method 3 is dominant 
amongst others, because method 3 gives nodes great flexibility to produce new XORed 
keys. The other methods somehow depend on the content of the node’s own keyring; 
however, method 3 gives nodes the chance to use the keyrings of two distinct direct 
secure neighbors. The second mostly used method is method 1. Method 2 is very similar 
to method 1 except for transferring XORed keys instead of single keys. This difference 
is the reason of the gap between the usage numbers of these methods, because it is 
harder to find appropriate XORed keys, as the XORed key pool size is much larger. 
Transfer cost defines the number of keys exchanged between sensor nodes in 
order to establish link keys in transfer phase. Transferred keys are usually the missing 
operands of XORed link keys. In method 1 and method 2, one key (single key for 
method 1 and XORed key for method 2) is transferred from direct secure neighbors in 
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order to produce a new XORed link key. Meanwhile in method 3, two single keys are 
transferred from two distinct direct secure neighbors. Here one should notice that keys 
are transferred whenever needed to establish a new secure link. In other words, they are 
transferred deterministically, not probabilistically. The number of keys transferred 
between secure direct neighbors is 269,210 for the case that 70 single keys and 30 
XORed keys are used which gives the highest local connectivity. For this case, 1.915 
keys are transferred on the average for each new established links during transfer phase. 
 
Figure 3.8. Resilience of our scheme compared to basic scheme. 
Figure 3.8 shows the resilience of our scheme compared to basic scheme. 
Resilience is the fraction of communication links compromised to all links at the end of 
a node capture attack. Lower values indicates more resilient network. In the figure, it is 
seen that as the fraction of XORed keys increase, the network becomes more resilient at 
the beginning of an attack. However, as the attack continues, basic scheme becomes 
slightly more resilient starting from the point where 0.6 fractions of links are 
compromised. Nevertheless when the optimal case of our scheme, which is the case 70 
single keys and 30 XORed keys are used, is compared to the basic scheme, the 
difference in ratio of links compromised is always lower than 5%. This means our 
scheme provides better connectivity with a marginal cost of resilience. 
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3.3.  Complexity Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the running times of the methods that take place in 
shared-key discovery phase and transfer phase of our proposed scheme. In the second 
part of shared-key discovery phase, nodes search their single keyrings to find two single 
keys that match an XORed key in the keyring of their unsecure neighbor when XORed. 
The complexity of this algorithm is  where n is the number of 
neighbor nodes in communication range,  is the single keyring size and  is the 
XORed keyring size. 
In the first method of transfer phase, nodes search the keys in the single keyrings 
of their secure neighbors and the keys in their single keyrings to find a match that XOR 
of those single keys is in the XORed keyring of their unsecure neighbor. They repeat 
this method for each unsecure neighbor. Hence, the complexity is . 
In the second method, nodes search the XORed keys in the keyrings of their 
secure neighbors and the XORed keys in their keyrings to find a combination that 
XORing of those XORed keys produces another XORed key that is in the XORed 
keyring of their unsecure neighbor. They run the method for each unsecure neighbor. 
Thus, the complexity of this method is . 
Nodes search the single keyrings of each pair of their secure neighbors to find two 
single keys that matches an XORed key in the keyring of their unsecure neighbor when 
they are XORed. Nodes iterate this method for each of their unsecure neighbors. 
Thereby, the complexity of the last method is , since three different 
neighbor nodes take place. 
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3.4.  Discussions and Conclusions 
All of the methods used in the transfer phase aim to set up new secure 
communication links. However, none of them directly use a transferred key, but modify 
them by performing XOR operations. This property improves resilience such that if a 
direct neighbor, from which a node transferred a key, is captured by an attacker, the 
node’s communication link may still remain safe. If transferred keys were used directly, 
then capture of one node would mean compromise of all link keys that are transferred 
from this capture node. 
Our scheme cannot be directly implemented into Du et al.’s scheme [5], because it 
uses matrices for distributing keys. But if we degrade λ-secure property to 0-secure 
property, which means basic scheme, then we can easily engage deployment knowledge 
into our scheme together with mentioned modifications to basic scheme above. 
We proposed a scheme that achieves high connectivity values as compared to 
basic scheme with same keyring sizes. In addition to this, our scheme uses XORed keys 
for link keys, if available. This plays a role to increase the resilience of the network, 
since an attacker needs to compromise two single keys instead of one. Our scheme uses 
a novel phase called transfer phase, in which the nodes transfer single or XORed keys 
directly from their secure neighbors. Our scheme achieves high local connectivity with 
carefully selected number of single and XORed keyring sizes. In our proposed scheme 
with 70 single keyring size and 30 XORed keyring size, there is an increase in local 
connectivity more than 50% as compared to basic scheme [4]. The cost of this 
improvement in local connectivity to the resilience is also minimal. The difference 
between resilience of our proposed scheme and basic scheme does not exceed 5%. 
Communication cost is minimized since keyring indices of neighbor nodes are already 
sent out in shared-key discovery phase. Nodes transfer only required keys from their 
neighbors and no pre-discovery of keys is needed during this phase. 
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4. IMPROVING CONNECTIVITY OF KEY PREDISTRIBUTION VIA 
TRANSFERRED KEYS 
In this section of the thesis, we propose a scheme that is an extension to basic 
scheme [4]. Our scheme is composed of three phases. These are (i) key predistribution, 
(ii) shared-key discovery phase, and (iii) transfer phase. First two phases are identical to 
the corresponding phases of the basic scheme. As a distinct feature, the third phase of 
our scheme, which is the transfer phase, is different from the path-key establishment 
phase of the basic scheme. 
In transfer phase, missing keys are asked from the secure neighbors in order to 
establish more secure links. As the indices of keys in the keyrings are sent out in shared-
key discovery phase, there is no need to an extra effort to learn the keyring contents of 
the neighbors to find out which of them have necessary keys. 
The method in the transfer phase of this scheme is tried in the XORed keying 
material scheme, which is proposed in Section 3, in the first place. Though, this method 
suppressed other methods used in XORed keying material scheme. Consequently, we 
removed the method from XORed keying material scheme and considered it as an 
independent scheme. 
The rest of this section is organized as follows. Our contribution is explained in 
Section 4.1. Section 4.2 discusses the analytical computations of the performance of our 
scheme and shows comparative performance evaluation. Discussions and conclusions of 
this scheme are given in Section 4.3. 
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Table 4.1 Symbols used in this section 
 Area of the sensor field 
 Global key pool size 
 Keyring size 
 Extended keyring size 
 Number of neighbors in communication range 
 Number of neighbors with at least one shared key 
 Probability of two nodes share at least one key, 
i.e. local connectivity after shared-key discovery phase 
 Connectivity after transfer phase 
 Set of all nodes 
 Neighbor list of node  
 Keyring of node  
 a sends key to b in a secure way 
 Radius of a node’s communication range 
 The average distance between any two neighboring nodes 
 The union area of the communication ranges of two neighboring nodes located at positions  
(0, 0) and (x, y) 
 The total number of the nodes that are neighbors to nodes a and/or b which are located at 
positions (0, 0) and (x, y) 
 The probability distribution function of the position of node b with respect to its neighboring 
node a located at position (0, 0) 
4.1.  Our Contribution 
Our solution is taking advantage of previously secured communication links 
between neighboring nodes. As it is known, unique identifiers of keys in the keyrings of 
all neighboring sensor nodes are sent out in shared-key discovery phase. This data can 
be kept in the memory of sensor nodes for the purpose of searching keyring content of 
neighbors while needed. If two neighboring sensor nodes a and b cannot find any 
common key to secure their communication link, they can individually search the 
keyring data of their neighbor nodes with which they already established secure 
communication. If one of the secure neighbors of a has already a shared key with b, 
node a asks that secure neighbor to transfer this shared key. After that, nodes a and b 
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establish a secure link using this key. Same situation is valid for node b also. For 
example, suppose node c is a neighbor of a and it shares a key with a, meaning that they 
have secured their communication in shared-key discovery phase. Moreover suppose 
that c and b have a common key, say K, in their keyrings. Since a knows the key indices 
of the keyrings of both c and b, a concludes that c can help to establish a secure link 
between a and b. To do so, a requests K from c and c transfers this shared key K to a via 
their secure link. Then the neighboring nodes a and b can use K to secure their 
communication. This algorithm is expressed in Figure 4.1 and it is also visualized in 
Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.1. Pseudo-code of transfer phase 
  
Figure 4.2. Visualization of transfer phase 
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This improvement to the basic scheme makes a situation as if the keyring size of a 
sensor node is the amount of unique keys in its keyring and in the keyrings of its 
neighbor nodes with a secured link.  This keyring is called extended keyring and its size, 
, has boundary conditions as specified below. 
      (4.1) 
In Equation 4.1,  is the maximum value for . This condition occurs 
when all the keys in the keyrings of d secure neighbors and node’s own keyring are 
unique. m is the minimum value for . This condition occurs when all the nodes in the 
neighborhood have the same keyring with the node’s own keyring. On the other hand, 
 is only the theoretical extended keyring size, not the actual one. Actual extended 
keyring includes only the predistributed keys in the node’s keyring and keys actually 
downloaded via secure channels during the transfer phase. As a result, if a sensor node 
is captured by an attacker, he/she can obtain only this amount of keys. 
Our scheme has significant advantages over basic scheme [4] with path-key 
establishment phase. In path-key establishment phase, a node has to find a secure path 
from itself to its unsecure neighbor in order to generate a link key. This is not handled 
intuitively, it broadcasts its secure neighbors if they know a path to its unsecure 
neighbor and its secure neighbors also broadcast this message to their corresponding 
neighbors and so on. Hence, this leads to a message flooding in the network. In our 
scheme there is no need to find that kind of path between unsecure neighbors. 
Moreover, the keyring contents of neighboring nodes are already discovered in shared-
key discovery phase. Therefore, there is no significant communication cost during 
transfer phase in our scheme. 
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4.2.  Performance Evaluation 
Further analysis of performance metrics are given in this section. We compared 
local connectivity and resilience performance of our scheme to the basic scheme after 
shared-key discovery and path-key establishment phases in the second part of this 
section. Communication cost analysis of transfer phase of our scheme and path-key 
establishment phase of basic scheme are also given in this part. Comparison of the 
scheme based on XORed keying material, which is proposed in Section 3, and the 
scheme proposed in this section is made in the third part of this section. 
4.2.1.  Analytical Formulations 
In this section, we give analytical formulation for the local connectivity of our 
scheme. We will use these formulations to support simulation results which will be 
given in the next subsection. Before giving the local connectivity calculations, we need 
to find the total number of sensor nodes that are neighbors to one or both of two 
neighboring nodes a and b. 
 
Figure 4.3 The coverage areas of two neighboring nodes a and b 
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We try to find the expected value of the colored area, which is the union of the 
communication ranges of neighboring nodes a and b, shown in Figure 4.3. In this 
figure, r is the radius of the communication range and t is the average distance between 
nodes a and b. 
Area of ABCD rhombus is formulated in Equation 4.2. Area of the union of 
coverage areas of nodes a and b, which is the overall colored region in Figure 4.3, is the 
difference between the sum and the intersection of two coverage areas. The intersection 
region is the darker zone in Figure 4.3 and it is calculated as the subtraction of the area 
of ABCD rhombus from the areas of CAD and CBD sectors. Area of the union region is 
formulated in Equation 4.3. 
      (4.2) 
  (4.3) 
The position of a neighboring node b, which is in the communication range of 
another node a, is assumed to be a bivariate uniformly distributed random variable with 
the following probability distribution function. 
      (4.4) 
Without loss of generality, we can assume that a is located at (0, 0) position. 
Therefore, the distance between a and b, namely t, is formulated as follows. 
      (4.5) 
By substituting Equation 4.5 in 4.3, we obtain Equation 4.6. 
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      (4.6) 
The expected value of  is calculated in Equation 4.7. 
      (4.7) 
where R is the circular coverage area of a node as shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4 The coverage area of a node a 
The total number of the nodes that are neighbors to nodes a and/or b is calculated 
as the total number of nodes in the intersection area minus 2 (for a and b). More 
formally, the total number of neighbors of a and/or b is calculated in Equation 4.8. 
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      (4.8) 
Expected value of  is the following. 
    (4.9) 
where R is the circular coverage area of a node as shown in Figure 4.4. 
When we substitute Equation 4.7 in Equation 4.9, we obtain the following 
equation. 
      (4.10) 
Local connectivity formulation of the basic scheme has been given in [4]. The 
probability that two nodes do not share any key after shared-key discovery phase, in 
other words their keyrings are composed of completely different keys, is given as 
follows. 
    (4.11) 
Local connectivity is the probability that any two nodes share at least one key in 
their keyrings. This can be found as the following. 
   (4.12) 
39 
 
In our transfer phase, neighboring nodes a and b individually try to find a secure 
neighbor that has a common key with the other one. If one of them succeeds, then a 
secure link between a and b is established. The candidate node that can help a and b in 
this process: (i) must be a secure neighbor of at least one of a and b, (ii) must have 
common key(s) in its keyring with both a and b. If the candidate node is in the union of 
coverage areas of a and b and has common keyring element with both, then it is already 
a secure neighbor of at least one of them. Therefore, the requirements expected from the 
candidate node is reduced to being in the union of the coverage areas of a and b and 
having common element in its keyring that is also in the keyring of a and common 
element in its keyring that is also in the keyring of b. 
The probability that a node has at least one common key with both a and b is . 
Therefore, the probability that this node does not have a common key with a and/or b is 
. There are on the average of  nodes with independent keyrings in the 
union area. The probability that none of those nodes can help to establish a secure link 
between a and b in the transfer phase is . Multiplying this value with the 
failure probability after shared key discovery phase yields overall failure probability of 
. Therefore the probability that a and b establish a secure link 
after the transfer phase, , is given as follows. 
       (4.13) 
4.2.2.  Simulation Results 
We performed simulations to analyze the performance of our scheme and compare 
it with existing schemes. Results of our scheme are compared with results of basic 
scheme [4] and basic scheme with one-hop path-key establishment phase. Basic scheme 
is composed of two fundamental phases. These phases are key predistribution phase and 
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shared-key discovery phase. One-hop path-key establishment phase is an add-on 
performed after shared-key discovery phase. Our transfer phase is another add-on, 
which is alternative to one-hop path-key establishment phase. It is performed after 
shared-key discovery phase. 
Simulation code is written using MATLAB language in Windows 32-bit operating 
system. In our simulations, 10000 nodes are distributed over a field of 1000 m  1000 
m. Nodes have a communication range of 40 m. In this setting, the expected value of the 
number of nodes in the union area of the coverage areas of two neighboring nodes is 
calculated as 69.05 using Equation 4.10. Two sets of simulations are performed for two 
different key pool sizes. In the first set, key pool contains 10,000 unique keys and in the 
second set, key pool contains 100,000 unique keys. 
In Figures 4.5 and 4.6, local connectivity values of pure basic scheme (i.e. shared-
key discovery phase), one-hop path-key establishment phase and transfer phase are 
compared. Horizontal axis indicates the keyring size of nodes, key pool size is set to 
10,000 in Figure 4.5 and 100,000 in Figure 4.6. In Figure 4.5, it is seen that basic 
scheme with shared-key discovery phase has ~1.0 local connectivity1 when 220 keys are 
preloaded to nodes’ keyrings. Path-key establishment phase raises local connectivity to 
~1.0 with keyring size of 75 keys. Our contribution, transfer phase, does the same with 
55 keys in the keyring. Transfer phase gives the same local connectivity performance 
with one fourth of keyring size as compared to basic scheme with shared-key discovery 
phase. 
                                                 
 
1 ~1.0 local connectivity means having a local connectivity value >0.99 in the rest of this section. 
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Figure 4.5. Comparison of local connectivities of basic scheme with shared-key 
discovery phase, basic scheme with path-key establishment phase and proposed scheme. 
Key pool size is 10,000. 
In Figure 4.6, local connectivity value of basic scheme with shared-key discovery 
phase approaches 0.5 when the keyring size is 250 with 100,000 key pool size setting. 
~1.0 local connectivity is achieved by basic scheme with path-key establishment phase 
when the keyring size is 230, rather, the same connectivity is achieved by our proposed 
scheme when the keyring size is 180. 
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Figure 4.6. Comparison of local connectivities of basic scheme with shared-key 
discovery phase, basic scheme with path-key establishment phase and proposed scheme. 
Key pool size is 100,000. 
Analytical formulations of local connectivity of transfer phase, which are given in 
Section 4.2.1, are compared with simulation results in Figures 4.7 and 4.8. We apply 
Equations 4.10 and 4.13 to calculate local connectivity. As can be seen from Figures 4.7 
and 4.8 with key pool sizes of 10,000 and 100,000 respectively, simulation and 
analytical results definitely match each other. This verifies the correctness of our 
simulations. 
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Figure 4.7. Comparison of simulative and analytical local connectivity of our scheme. 
Key pool size is 10,000. 
 
Figure 4.8. Comparison of simulative and analytical local connectivity of our scheme. 
Key pool size is 100,000. 
Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 show comparative resilience of basic scheme with 
shared-key discovery phase and our proposed scheme for different key pool sizes. 
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Resilience is measured as the fraction of indirectly compromised links to all established 
links. Smaller this ratio is better the resilience. In a network with key pool size of 
10,000 keys, shared-key discovery phase with 220 keys preloaded in keyrings of each 
node has a local connectivity of value ~1.0. The same local connectivity value can be 
achieved with the transfer phase with only 55 keys preloaded in nodes’ keyrings. As can 
be seen from Figure 4.9, our scheme with transfer phase performs much better than 
basic scheme in this setting. Resiliency performance of our scheme is up to 35% better 
than basic scheme with shared-key discovery phase when the number of nodes captured 
is 120. 
 
Figure 4.9. Fraction of communications compromised vs. number of nodes captured by 
the attacker for basic scheme with shared-key discovery phase and our proposed 
scheme. Local connectivity is set to ~1.0 for both cases, key pool size is 10,000. 
In Figure 4.10, local connectivity value is set to 0.45 for both of basic scheme 
with shared-key discovery phase and our proposed scheme and key pool size is set to 
100,000. Our scheme is more resilient up to 40% as compared to basic scheme with 
shared-key discovery phase when the number of nodes captured is 240. 
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Figure 4.10. Fraction of communications compromised vs. number of nodes captured by 
the attacker for basic scheme with shared-key discovery phase and our proposed 
scheme. Local connectivity is set to 0.45 for both cases, key pool size is 100,000. 
Figure 4.11 shows resilience of both schemes with local connectivity value of 
~1.0. In order to catch up ~1.0 local connectivity in basic scheme with shared-key 
discovery phase with a key pool size of 100,000 keys, the keyring size of nodes is set to 
680. The keyring size of nodes in our scheme is only 180. In this setting, the 
performance boost of our scheme is clearer. Our scheme is 50% better than basic 
scheme with shared-key discovery phase, when the number of nodes captured is 240. 
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Figure 4.11. Fraction of communications compromised vs. number of nodes captured by 
the attacker for basic scheme with shared-key discovery phase and our proposed 
scheme. Local connectivity is set to ~1.0 for both cases, key pool size is 100,000. 
Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show comparative resilience results of basic scheme with 
one-hop path-key establishment phase and our scheme with transfer phase. Path-key 
establishment phase and transfer phase are alternatives of each other and they are both 
performed after shared-key discovery phase. Our scheme achieves ~1.0 local 
connectivity with keyring size of 55 keys, whereas one-hop path-key establishment 
phase needs 75 keyring size when the key pool size is 10,000.  This parameters are 
realized as 230 keys for the keyring size in basic scheme with one-hop path-key 
establishment phase and 180 keys for the keyring size in our proposed scheme when the 
key pool size is set to 100,000. Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show the resilience performance 
of both schemes when the local connectivity is ~1.0. As can be seen from both figures, 
those two phases give the same performance more or less. But the keyring size is 20 and 
50 keys fewer in our transfer phase as compared to path-key establishment phase. 
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Figure 4.12. Fraction of communications compromised vs. number of nodes captured by 
the attacker for basic scheme with path-key establishment phase and our proposed 
scheme. Local connectivity is set to ~1.0 for both cases, key pool size is 10,000. 
 
Figure 4.13. Fraction of communications compromised vs. number of nodes captured by 
the attacker for basic scheme with path-key establishment phase and our proposed 
scheme. Local connectivity is set to ~1.0 for both cases, key pool size is 100,000. 
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Figures 4.14 and 4.15 show additional communication cost per link that arises 
from secure link establishment activities in one-hop path-key establishment phase and 
our transfer phase. Communication cost per link is the average number of messages sent 
in order to establish a new secure link after shared-key discovery phase. It should be 
noted that communication cost resulted from shared-key discovery phase is not taken 
into account since this cost is same in both path-key establishment phase and our 
transfer phase. 
In transfer phase, a node tries to find keys in the keyrings of its secure neighbors 
that are common with its unsecure neighbors. If there are such keys, it sends messages 
to transfer those keys, if there is no such a key, it does not send any message. At the 
same time, it informs its unsecure neighbors that it is able to establish secure link with 
them, then the secure neighbors transfer the common keys. If we optimize the 
messaging even further, nodes can concatenate the request messages to transfer 
common keys from secure neighbors and information messages that are sent to the 
unsecure neighbors in one broadcasting message. After those broadcasting messages, 
secure neighbors send each common key in separate messages. Additional 
communication cost for our transfer phase is calculated as the sum of the number of 
nodes initiate transfer phase messaging and number of transferred keys. Additional 
communication cost per link is the fraction of additional communication cost to the 
number of secure links established in transfer phase. 
The scenario is different in path-key establishment phase. Each node broadcasts a 
message in order to find an intermediate node that will help to establish a secure link 
with its unsecure neighbor. Each node sends this broadcasting message regardless of the 
existence of such an intermediate node, because nodes do not have any knowledge of 
secure neighbor list of nodes. If there is such an intermediate node, the broadcasting 
node generates a link key and sends it to its unsecure neighbor through the intermediate 
node. As a result, additional communication cost is calculated by the number of nodes 
that broadcast message, all the nodes in this case, plus number of link keys generated 
times two for the messages from the originator to the intermediate node and from the 
intermediate node to the destination. Additional communication cost per link is the ratio 
of additional communication cost to the number of new established secure links. 
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In Figures 4.14 and 4.15, additional communication cost per link is depicted in 
logarithmic scale. Key pool size is set to 10,000 in Figure 4.14 and 100,000 in Figure 
4.15. Additional communication cost per link for basic scheme with path-key 
establishment phase is very high at the beginning. The reason is that all the nodes 
broadcast message regardless of establishing secure links or not. Afterwards, additional 
communication cost per link value for basic scheme with path-key establishment phase 
stabilizes at 2.1. Additional communication cost per link value for our scheme is 
stabilized at a lower level, at 1.1. 
 
Figure 4.14. Additional number of messages sent in order to establish a new secure link 
in basic scheme with path-key establishment phase and our proposed scheme. Key pool 
size is 10,000. 
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Figure 4.15. Additional number of messages sent in order to establish a new secure link 
in basic scheme with path-key establishment phase and our proposed scheme. Key pool 
size is 100,000. 
In transfer phase, nodes search the keyrings of their secure neighbors if there is a 
match with the keys in the keyrings of their unsecure neighbors. They repeat this 
operation for each unsecure neighbor. The complexity of this algorithm is 
 where k is the number of neighbor nodes in communication range and 
m is the keyring size. 
4.2.3.  Comparison of the Schemes Proposed in Last Two Sections 
The scheme proposed in Section 3, namely XORed keying material, can reach 
local connectivity up to 0.97 when the optimal keyring mixture of single and XORed 
keys are used. This optimal case is the single keyring size of 70 keys and XORed 
keyring size of 30 keys when the total keyring size is 100 and key pool size is 10,000.  
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The same connectivity is achieved by the scheme proposed in this section when the 
keyring size is 50 and key pool size is 10,000. 
Figure 4.16 shows the resiliency performance of the proposed scheme in Section 3 
(XORed keying material) and the proposed scheme in this section in the same 
connectivity value. The scheme proposed in this section has better resiliency 
performance than the XORed keying material up to 23% when the number of nodes 
captured is 120. 
 
Figure 4.16. Fraction of communications compromised vs. number of nodes captured by 
the attacker for the proposed scheme in Section 3 (XORed keying material) and the 
proposed scheme in this section. Local connectivity is set to 0.97 for both schemes, key 
pool size is 10,000. 
4.3.  Discussions and Conclusions 
In this section, we introduced a scheme and compared its performance to the 
shared-key discovery phase and path-key establishment phase of basic scheme [4]. Our 
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scheme achieved the same high local connectivity with one fourth of the size of the 
keyring as compared to basic scheme after shared-key discovery phase when the key 
pool size is 10,000. Our scheme has almost full connectivity while nodes are loaded 
with 20 and 50 fewer keys than the nodes in basic scheme after path-key establishment 
phase in networks with key pool sizes of 10,000 and 100,000 keys, respectively. 
Moreover, our scheme increases local connectivity without any degradation in 
resilience. Resilience performance of our scheme is up to 50% better than basic scheme 
after shared-key discovery phase and more or less the same with basic scheme after 
path-key establishment phase. The keyring indices of neighbors which are broadcasted 
in shared-key discovery phase are used in our scheme, thus communication cost is also 
minimal as compared to path-key establishment phase. Additional communication cost 
per link is 1 message fewer in our transfer phase. 
Our contribution to basic scheme is such a generic framework that it can be 
applied to most specialized schemes using probabilistic key predistribution. Our 
contribution can be also implemented into schemes using deployment knowledge such 
as Du et al.’s scheme [6]. In Du et al.’s case [6], intermediate node can be used to 
transfer necessary shares of key matrix to establish communication with a neighbor 
which does not share a common key. 
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5.  GENERATIONWISE KEY PREDISTRIBUTION APPROACH FOR 
MULTIPHASE WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
In this section a resilient key predistribution scheme for multi-phase wireless 
sensor networks is proposed. We compared its performance with another well-known 
multi-phase key predistribution scheme, RoK [9], and we saw performance boosts in 
resilience up to 35%. 
The rest of this section is organized as follows. The RGM scheme, our 
contribution, is explained in Section 5.1. Threat model and resiliency metrics are 
described in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 discusses the comparative performance evaluation. 
Finally, Section 5.4 concludes the scheme. 
List of symbols used in this section is given in Table 2.1. 
5.1.  Our Contribution 
In this subsection, the proposed RGM (Random Generation Material) key 
predistribution scheme for multi-phase wireless sensor networks is designed. 
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5.1.1.  Motivation 
Our aim in this study is to develop a key predistribution scheme for multi-phase 
sensor networks with improved resiliency as compared to RoK scheme [9]. In order to 
understand the resiliency behavior of RoK scheme, we analyze resistance of forward 
and backward keyrings. We performed simulations in order to see how many active 
attacks are thwarted by the use of forward and backward keyrings. The results are 
shown in Figure 5.1. As can be seen from Figure 5.1, number of failed attacks due to 
backward keyring linearly increases in time. This shows that backward keyring is 
playing an important role in preventing the communication links from being 
compromised. On the other hand, the number of failed attacks due to forward keyring 
remains constant at around generation 5, when initially deployed nodes are still alive. 
This observation shows that forward keyring is ineffective to resist against attacks after 
a certain point. The reason of this behavior of RoK is due to the fact that once an 
attacker learns a forward key, it can repeatedly compute forward keys of upcoming 
generations by simply hashing. Therefore, the forward key pool is totally revealed to the 
attacker after some generations.  
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Figure 5.1. Resistance of forward and backward keyrings of RoK in case of an attack. 
Pool size is 10000 for forward and backward key pools; keyring size is 500. The 
attacker randomly captures 30 nodes per generation. 
Abovementioned analyses on the resistance of forward and backward keyrings 
show that RoK's double hash chain approach reveals too much information to an active 
attacker. In order to reduce the information that an attacker obtains out of a captured 
node, we envision to use pairwise keys between node pairs of particular generations 
instead of using chain of keys lasting as long as the lifetime of the network. This is the 
base of our RGM approach that will be detailed in the next subsections.  
5.1.2.  Overview 
In our RGM method, the concept of overlapping generations is not used. Instead 
of forward and backward keyrings, one keyring, called the generation keyring, is used. 
Also one key pool, called generation key pool, is used for each generation. In contrast to 
RoK, key pool in our RGM scheme is reconstructed randomly by a distribution center at 
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each generation. On the other hand, keys that are used to establish links evolve in a 
different way, independent of evolution of generation key pool. This will be discussed 
in detail below. 
In our scheme, generation key pool randomly refreshes in time.  Therefore, there 
is no relation between past and future states of the pool in our scheme. This property is 
very important in order to limit attacker’s capability. On the other hand, we need to 
provide connectivity between nodes deployed at different generations. Connectivity will 
be obtained by evolving not the key pool itself, but evolving keys individually. 
Restricting the use of a particular key for specific generations is another resiliency 
improving factor for our method. In our RGM scheme, the keys are designed to be used 
between node pairs that are deployed at particular generations. For instance, the link key 
used between nodes A deployed at generation f and B deployed at generation g is 
confined to nodes deployed at one of these generations if they store the keys with same 
indices. Nodes deployed at generations other than f and g have no access to this link 
key. This has an advantage over RoK [9] in restricting the information an attacker 
acquires if he/she captures a node. In such a case, he/she can compromise the keys used 
between generation at which captured node has been deployed and other generations 
within the generation window. Hence if the attacker wants to compromise a predefined 
link indirectly, he/she must compromise nodes which have keys in their keyring with 
the same shared indices and have been deployed at the same generations with one of the 
ends of that predefined link. What our method tries to do is to increase the number of 
constraints that an attacker should obey. In this way, we improve the resiliency of the 
wireless sensor network. 
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5.1.3.  Predistribution of Generation Material 
In multi-phase WSNs, each node tries to establish secure links with its 
neighboring nodes even if they belong to different generations. Therefore, nodes 
deployed both at the same and different generations should share keys.  
In RGM, each generation has its own key pool, denoted as  for the nodes 
deployed at generation j. 
      (5.1) 
In RGM, keyring of a sensor node A deployed at generation j, is split into several 
sub-keyrings in order to establish link with nodes deployed at same or different 
generations. One of the sub-keyring is reserved for current generation keys, which are 
used to establish secure communication with other nodes deployed in same generation. 
Keys in this sub-keyring are randomly selected from the node's own generation key pool 
without replacement. More formally, for a node A deployed at generation j, same 
generation sub-keyring, , is as shown below. 
      (5.2) 
where each  is a key selected at random from  without replacement 
(i.e. a particular member of  cannot appear in this sub-keyring of a particular 
node more than once). Here  denotes the index of the randomly selected keys for this 
sub-keyring. 
The same generation sub-keyring is also needed to establish secure links with 
nodes deployed at past generations. A secure hashing algorithm is used for that. Details 
will be discussed in the following subsection. 
Other sub-keyrings of a node are used to establish secure links with nodes 
deployed at future generations. These future generation sub-keyrings contain a 
transformed version of generation keys selected at random from the key pools of future 
generations as explained below. For a node A deployed at generation j, future generation 
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sub-keyring containing random keys used to secure communication with nodes 
deployed at a future generation , where  is given as follows.  
  (5.3) 
where each  is a key selected at random from  without 
replacement and  denotes the index of the randomly selected keys for this sub-
keyring. 
This process can be detailed as follows. In order to form the future generation 
sub-keyring , the node A first picks n random keys from the key pool of the 
future generation  without replacement. Each of these keys is appended with the 
generation number of A, which is j, and hashed using a secure hash function like SHA-1 
[18] or SHA-256 [19] depending on the key size. These hashed values are stored in the 
sub-keyring. In this way, we customize the keys belonging to a future generation to be 
used in another generation without storing the actual keys, thanks to the one-way 
property of the secure hash functions. The way these transformed (hashed) keys are 
used to establish link keys will be explained in the next subsection. 
To sum up, in RGM, keyring of a sensor node contains random keys picked from 
the current generation key pool and transformed random keys for up to  future 
generations picked from future generation key pools. More formally, for a node A 
deployed at generation j, its keyring  is shown as follows. 
   (5.4) 
In RGM, sensor nodes store m current generation keys and n future generation 
keys for each upcoming generation. Because a sensor node may communicate with at 
most st next generation, the maximum value for the total amount keys in the 
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generation keyring of a particular node (say node A deployed at generation j) is 
calculated as follows. 
      (5.5) 
However, in RGM, it is possible not to share keys with less future generations in 
order to save the memory. We will detail this case in Section 5.3.2. 
5.1.4.  Calculation of Link Keys 
After the generation of the keyrings, the nodes are deployed over the sensor field. 
At the beginning of each generation, each node broadcasts the indices of the keys in its 
keyring together with the corresponding generation information. After that, the nodes 
decide whether they have common keys or not. In our RGM scheme, as in RoK scheme, 
all the shared generation keys contribute to the link key. Contribution of as many keys 
as possible increases the resistance of link against attacks.  
If two nodes, say A and B, belong to the same generation j and if they have 
common generation keys with indices  (i.e. the keys ), they 
compute their link key as follows. 
      (5.6) 
If the nodes belong to different generations, the link key creation process is 
different. Let’s suppose, node A deployed at generation f and another node B deployed 
at generation g have common generation keys with indices . They compute 
their link key as follows: 
, where     (5.7) 
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Node A already has each of these generation keys  since they are in the future 
generation sub-keyrings of A. By using these keys, node A can easily calculate . 
However, from the point of view of node B, the generation keys  are past 
generation keys and therefore they are not the part of its keyring. Fortunately, node B 
can calculate . As discussed in the previous subsection, , where 
H is a secure and one-way hash function. Node B is deployed at generation g, therefore 
its same generation sub-keyring contains the current generation key . By using , 
it calculates the keys  and then  . 
The generation key  with index v can be computed by a node if and only if 
this node has been deployed at generation g and has current generation key  with 
index v in its keyring. As a result, a sensor node C, which is deployed at another 
generation e cannot compute generation key  even if it has generation key  
with the same index v. The reason is that the node C needs  in order to compute 
 and it cannot obtain  using  due to the one-way property of the secure 
hash function H.  
It is clear that a generation key  with index v may be known only by nodes of 
generations f and g. No node deployed at another generation can compute the key that is 
unique to generation f and g. So an attacker has to spend extra effort in order to capture 
the nodes belonging to generations f or g if he/she wants to acquire the link key between 
nodes A and B that are deployed at generations f and g, respectively. This is the main 
factor of improved resiliency in our RGM scheme. However, storing generation keys 
for particular generation pairs causes increased memory usage in order to reach 
acceptable level of connectivity. Such performance metrics are analyzed in more detail 
in Section 5.3. 
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5.2.  Threat Model and Resiliency Metrics 
In this subsection, we describe the threat model used in this thesis for both RoK 
and our proposed RGM schemes. We assume the existence of an attacker who is 
capable of capturing nodes at random locations in the sensor field. The rate at which the 
attacker captures nodes is a system parameter. As the attacker captures nodes, it learns 
keys that exist in the captured nodes' keyrings. These keys are not only used to 
compromise the communications of the captured nodes, but also used to compromise 
the secure links among non-captured nodes since the keys can be reused throughout the 
networks. A resilient design aims reduce the effect of captured nodes over such 
innocent nodes.  
We employ two attacker types, eager attacker and temporary attacker, as in [9].  
Eager attacker identifies an attacker who starts his/her activity at the beginning of 
network and continues till the end. Temporary attacker attacks on the network for a 
fixed amount of time which is relatively smaller than the lifetime of the network.  
As in [9], the resiliency of the sensor network against node capture attacks will be 
measured via compromised link ratio in this section. Compromised link ratio is defined 
as the fraction of indirectly compromised links. That is, if this ratio is low, the network 
is more resilient. Indirectly compromised link is a link whose keys are known by the 
attacker, but none of the sensors in both ends is captured.  
We consider two resiliency metrics: active resiliency and total resiliency.   
Active resiliency is the resiliency due to current alive links. A link is said 
to be alive if both ends are alive; otherwise, that link is said to be dead. Active 
resiliency is measured with the metric of active compromised links ratio which 
is defined as the ratio of compromised alive links to all established alive links.  
Total resiliency is the resiliency due to all links (dead and alive) and it is 
measured with total compromised links ratio metric. Total compromised links 
ratio is defined as the ratio of the all indirectly compromised dead or alive links 
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over all established links since the beginning of the network. Total resiliency is 
important if the attacker keeps log of communications in the network. When a 
link is compromised even if its endpoints are dead, an attacker may have a look 
at the logged messages and learn the contents. Of course, the content of the 
message may not be as valuable as when it was sent. 
Actually, both active and total compromised links ratio metrics are inversely 
related to the resiliency. As these ratios go low, the network's resiliency becomes high. 
In the rest of this section, we will use both resiliency and compromised links ratio 
terms. The readers are advised to interpret the inverse relationship between these two 
terms. 
5.3.  Performance Evaluation 
We performed simulative performance evaluation to compare the performances of 
RoK [9] and the proposed RGM methods. Some results are also verified analytically. 
Different scenarios based on different keyring sizes are analyzed. We first give the 
analytical formulations for the proposed RGM scheme. Then, the simulation setting is 
described. After that we discuss performance results of three different scenarios. 
5.3.1.  Analytical Formulations 
In this subsection we formulate upper and lower bounds of the local connectivity 
metric in RGM. Local connectivity is defined as the probability that two neighboring 
nodes sharing at least one key in their keyrings. In RGM scheme, key sharing 
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probabilities of the node pairs deployed at the same generations and at different 
generations are different since different parts of the keyring are utilized for these two 
types of connections.  
We first formulate the key sharing probability of neighboring node pairs deployed 
at the same generation, which is denoted as psg. Current generation sub-keyrings are 
used for same generation nodes. There are m current generation keys in the keyrings of 
the nodes deployed at the same generation. Such a case is similar to Eschenauer and 
Gligor’s basic scheme [4].  As described in [7, 9], the probability that two nodes sharing 
at least one key in their sub-keyrings of m keys is given as follows. 
      (5.8) 
We now formulate the key sharing probability of neighboring node pairs deployed 
at different generations, which is denoted as pdg. A node can produce m past generation 
keys by making use of its m current generation keys. Besides, a node retains n future 
generation keys for each future generation in its window. In order for a node pair 
deployed at different generations to establish a pairwise key, there should be at least one 
common key between the current generation sub-keyring of one of the nodes, say A, and 
the future generation sub-keyring of the other node, say B, that corresponds to the 
generation of A. This is equivalent to the fact that a sub-keyring with m elements and 
another sub-keyring with n elements, which are picked from a global key pool of P 
elements, should have a non-null intersection set. There are total of  such sub-
keyring pairs out of which  sub-keyring pairs have no common 
elements. Thus the probability that two nodes deployed at different generations sharing 
a common key, pdg, is formulated as follows. 
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      (5.9) 
In our RGM scheme, we take . In this setting, equations 5.8 and 5.9 imply 
that , since key sharing probability is higher for larger keyring size. At any 
given time, a mix of current generation and different generation neighbors exist in the 
network. Therefore, the overall local connectivity is between these two probability 
values. In conclusion, it can be said that psg is the upper bound and pdg is the lower 
bound for local connectivity, i.e. . Due to node depletions and new 
deployments, local connectivity may change at each generation. However, it should 
remain within that range. In the beginning, all the nodes are deployed at the same initial 
generation, that’s why local connectivity is expected to be equal to psg at generation 0. 
This is the maximum value of the local connectivity. As the nodes start to die and new 
nodes replace the dead ones in upcoming generations, the nodes in the network become 
heterogenic with respect to deployment generations. As a result, local connectivity 
value is expected to decrease and approach to the lower bound pdg, but we do not expect 
that the local connectivity reaches pdg. This is due to the fact that there will always be 
some neighboring node pairs belonging to the same generation, which will cause 
increased local connectivity. We will simulatively analyze how the local connectivity 
changes in time in Section 5.3.3. At this section, we will also show that the lower and 
upper bounds, and abovementioned expected behavior hold.  
Another performance metric is about the resiliency of the network in the presence 
of an attacker. This metric is the probability that a link is compromised when a set of 
nodes are captured. Analytical formulation of this metric is given in [9].  However, 
instant changes at generation level cannot be observed due to approximations made in 
the formulas. Therefore, we decided not to use analytical formulation for resiliency 
metrics, but conduct extensive simulations that will be detailed in the next subsections. 
We compared our simulation results for RoK with the ones given in the original paper 
[9]. This verifies the accuracy and correctness of our simulation code. 
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5.3.2.  Simulation Setup 
All the simulations are implemented in Python programming language using 
Eclipse Classic environment for Microsoft Windows Vista 32-bit operating system. We 
worked on an Intel Q6600 powered machine running at 2.4 GHz clock speed. 
In our simulations of both RGM and RoK schemes, 400 sensor nodes are initially 
deployed in a square field using two-dimensional uniform random distribution. One side 
of this square field is 634 meters that makes average number of neighbors of a sensor 
node approximately 4 nodes with the assumption that communication range of a node is 
40 meters. Generation window ( ) is set to 6. Sensor nodes have a random lifetime 
assigned according to Gaussian distribution with mean , and standard deviation 
. Whenever a node is deployed, it starts to function immediately. In our 
simulation model, the sink determines the amount of nodes that are going to stop 
functioning before each generation. After that, at the beginning of each generation, that 
amount of new nodes are deployed over the sensor field using two-dimensional uniform 
random distribution.  
Simulations are run along 50 generations. For the sake of accuracy, all simulations 
are run 25 times and their average values are shown in the figures. 
We have analyzed three simulation scenarios. In all of them, they key pools size 
of RGM scheme is set to 10000 keys. Moreover, the total keyring size of the RGM 
scheme is taken as 500 keys. As discussed in Section 5.1, RGM scheme has different m 
and n values for current generation sub-keyring and future generation sub-keyrings. In 
our simulations, m is set to 200 and n is set to 100. Normally, a node contains future 
generation sub-keyrings for up to  upcoming generations. However, in order to 
optimize keyring size and use the memory efficiently in RGM, we do not store last two 
future generation sub-keyrings in the nodes' keyrings since the probability of 
encountering two neighboring nodes with ages differing more than 3 generations is very 
low (this result has been obtained experimentally, however, for the sake of brevity we 
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will not discuss the details of these experiments). In this way, the size of the keyring of 
a sensor node in RGM becomes . 
The key pool and keyring size for RoK in each simulation scenario are different. 
The details about how the key pool size is set and keyrings are arranged will be given 
for each scenario separately. 
Our attack model assumes an attacker who can capture nodes at random locations. 
In the simulations, the attacker's capture rate is taken as 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round. In 
our scheme, round is the time unit and one generation consists of 10 rounds. 
5.3.3.  Scenario 1: Same Key Memory Usage Case 
In the first group of simulations, our RGM scheme and the RoK scheme are 
compared in exactly same key memory and key pool sizes. For both RoK and RGM 
schemes, the key pool size is set to 10000 keys and the keyring memory size is set to 
500 keys. For the RoK scheme, the keyring size of 500 is the minimum size to reach 1.0 
local connectivity when the key pool has 10000 keys. RoK utilizes memory by 
dedicating half of the memory to forward keyring, and the other half to backward 
keyring. In the following simulations, each RoK keyring has 250 keys. In the RGM 
scheme, m = 200 keys of the total 500 keys are used for same generation sub-keyring. 
Moreover, there are  = 3 future generation sub-keyrings in RGM and n = 100 
future generation keys are predistributed for each upcoming generation.  
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Figure 5.2. Active compromised links ratio of RoK and RGM in case of an eager 
attacker with capture rates of 1, 3, and 5 nodes per round, memory size is 500 and key 
pool size is 10000 for both of RoK and RGM. 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show resiliency of the sensor network against an eager 
attacker. The resiliency metrics used here are active and total compromised links ratios 
as defined in Section 5.2. Eager attacker starts capturing nodes at the beginning of the 
network and continues indefinitely.  
As can be seen from Figure 5.2, active compromised links ratio reaches its highest 
value in around generation 3, when most of nodes deployed at the initial phase are alive. 
After this time on, first nodes start to die, and resiliency stabilizes together with arrival 
of new nodes. Our results show that in the steady state our RGM scheme performs 35% 
better than RoK scheme at capture rate of 5 nodes per round. At capture rates of 1 and 3 
nodes per round, in the steady state both schemes perform almost equally.  
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Figure 5.3. Total compromised links ratio of RoK and RGM in case of an eager attacker 
with capture rates of 1, 3, and 5 per round, memory size is 500 and key pool size is 
10000 for both of RoK and RGM. 
Figure 5.3 shows total resiliency of RoK and our RGM schemes. As can be seen 
from Figure 5.3, RGM scheme, as opposed to RoK scheme, reaches its steady-state at 
the beginning of network lifetime, around 3rd generation. The reason of this behavior of 
RGM is that the generation key pools are independent of each other and are useful only 
for small period of time. On the other hand, RoK's total compromised links ratio has 
tendency to increase as the network gets older. Although, RoK initially performs better, 
in the later generations (after 5th generation for 5 nodes/round; after 9th generation for 3 
nodes/round, after 15th generation for 1 node/round) RGM starts performing better than 
RoK in all capture rates. In RoK, total compromised links ratio values tend to converge 
around 0.7 in high capture rates, meaning that 70% of the links are compromised. 
However, in our RGM scheme, even if the network is attacked with the highest rate of 5 
nodes per round, the total compromised links ratio value slightly goes over 0.5. For 
lower capture rates, performance improvement of RGM over RoK is clearer. When the 
capture rate is 1 node per round, at the end of the simulations the number of links that 
the attacker captures is approximately five-fold more in RoK scheme as compared to 
our RGM.  
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Figure 5.4 comparatively shows active resiliency of RoK and RGM in case of a 
temporary attacker who starts his/her activity in generation 5 and ends in generation 14. 
When the attack starts, compromised links ratio raises up to an upper-bound which is 
different for all corruption rates. After attack stops, network starts to heal itself. As it 
can be seen from Figure 5.4, both schemes completely heals (i.e. ratio of compromised 
links come to zero) almost at the same time (generation 18). Figure 5.4 also shows that 
during the attack, RGM performs as much as 30% better than RoK for capture rate of 5 
nodes per round.  
 
Figure 5.4. Active compromised links ratio of RoK and RGM in case of a temporary 
attacker with capture rates of 1, 3, and 5 per round, memory size is 500 and key pool 
size is 10000 for both of RoK and RGM. 
One drawback of RGM scheme is that local connectivity of RGM tends to be less 
than in RoK. As described previously, local connectivity is defined as the probability of 
any two neighbors to share at least one common key. The local connectivity values of 
RoK and RGM for the cases that we analyze are given in Figure 5.5. As can be seen 
from this figure, in RGM neighboring nodes share at least one key with a probability of 
around 0.9, while in RoK this value is 1.0. That means our scheme performs 10% worse 
than RoK. However, this does not mean that 10% of the nodes are completely disjointed 
from the network. 0.9 local connectivity means 10% of all possible links are insecure. 
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However, the end points of these insecure links have at least one other secure neighbor 
and via these secure neighbors they are connected to the network securely. That is why 
90% local connectivity, as in RGM scheme, is considered more than enough for the 
secure operation of the network. 
 
Figure 5.5. Local connectivity of RoK and RGM, memory size is 500 and key pool size 
is 10000 for both of RoK and RGM. 
In this scenario, where P is 10000, m is 200, and n is 100 for RGM, Equations 5.8 
and 5.9 yield that psg = 0.983 and pdg = 0.869. It can easily be seen from Figure 5.5 that 
local connectivity is almost equal to psg at generation 0 since all nodes are same 
generation nodes initially. As time goes along, connectivity decreases as the nodes 
belonging different generations are deployed. Around generation 5, local connectivity 
reaches steady state. At this steady state, local connectivity is greater than the lower 
bound pdg, but never reaches this lower bound due to same generation nodes existing in 
the network. These observations are consistent with the analytical discussions given in 
Section 5.3.1.  
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5.3.4.  Scenario 2: Same Local Connectivity Case 
In this scenario we compare our RGM scheme at the same local connectivity 
value as the RoK scheme. We selected 0.9 as this connectivity value. To reach this 
value, the memory size of a node in RoK is set to 300 keys, where half of this memory 
is used for forward keyring, and the other half is used for backward keyring. The 
memory size for RGM is the same as Scenario 1 (total memory is 500 keys, m =  200, 
n = 100 and the number of future generation sub-keyrings is 3). The key pool size is set 
to 10000 keys. In this configuration, both RoK and RGM have 0.9 local connectivity as 
shown in Figure 5.6. Initially, local connectivity of RGM is higher than 0.9, but it falls 
down in the first 3 generations, and then it stabilizes at 0.9. The reason for this behavior 
has been discussed in Section 5.3.3.  
 
Figure 5.6. Local connectivity of RoK and RGM, memory size is 300 for RoK and 500 
for RGM, key pool size is 10000 for both of them. 
Figure 5.7 and 5.8 show resiliency of RoK and RGM in case of an eager and 
temporary attacker infiltrates into the network, respectively. RGM configuration and 
consequently the resiliency behaviors are same as before, but this time memory size of 
nodes in RoK is lowered while keeping the pool size fixed. This causes a bit less active 
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resiliency (i.e. a bit higher compromised links ratio) for RoK in both eager and 
temporary attack cases as compared to Scenario 1. In general, we can say that in this 
scenario active resiliency of our proposed RGM scheme is 35% - 50% better than RoK 
for capture rates of 3 and 5 nodes per round. 
 
Figure 5.7. Active compromised links ratio of RoK and RGM in case of an eager 
attacker with capture rates of 1, 3, and 5 nodes per round, memory size is 300 for RoK 
and 500 for RGM, key pool size is 10000 for both of them. 
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Figure 5.8. Active compromised links ratio of RoK and RGM in case of a temporary 
attacker with capture rates of 1, 3, and 5 per round, memory size is 300 for RoK and 
500 for RGM, key pool size is 10000 for both of them. 
Figure 5.9 shows the total resiliency performance in the eager attack case. The 
performance of RGM scheme is the same as Scenario 1 since the same parameters are 
used for RGM. Although the keyring size is reduced in this scenario for RoK, we do not 
observe any significant difference in RoK scheme. Thus, as described in Section 5.3.3 
for Scenario 1, total resiliency performance of our RGM scheme is clearly better than 
RoK in all capture rates.  
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Figure 5.9. Total compromised links ratio of RoK and RGM in case of an eager attacker 
with capture rates of 1, 3, and 5 per round, memory size is 300 for RoK and 500 for 
RGM, key pool size is 10000 for both of them. 
5.3.5.  Scenario 3: Same Keyring Memory Size and Same Local 
Connectivity Case 
In this last scenario, we consider same memory usage and same local connectivity 
cases for both RoK and RGM. To have equality in these two parameters, we used 
different key pool sizes for both schemes. Unlike previous scenarios, forward and 
backward key pool size in RoK is set to 28000 keys each. In our RGM scheme, the 
generation key pool size is set to 10000 keys as in other scenarios. Keyring size is set to 
500 keys in both RoK and RGM schemes. As before, RoK utilizes its memory by 
reserving its half of memory to backward keyring and the other half to forward keyring; 
in our RGM scheme, nodes are loaded with current generation sub-keyring of size 
m = 200, and three future generation sub-keyrings of size n = 100 each. 
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Figure 5.10 and 5.11 show active resiliency against eager and temporary attackers, 
respectively. As can be seen from these figures, in this scenario both RoK and RGM 
perform equally. However, our RGM scheme still performs better in total resiliency 
metric which is depicted in Figure 5.12. 
Although RoK improves its own total resiliency in this scenario as compared to 
previous scenarios due to increased key pool size, Figure 5.12 shows that our RGM 
scheme is still better than RoK in all capture rates up to three-fold. Total compromised 
links ratio of RoK scheme becomes greater than that of RGM around 15th generation 
and RGM scheme preserves this better performance until the end of network life. 
 
Figure 5.10. Active compromised links ratio of RoK and RGM in case of an eager 
attacker with capture rates of 1, 3, and 5 nodes per round, memory size is 500 for both 
of RoK and RGM, key pool size is 28000 for RoK, 10000 for RGM. 
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Figure 5.11. Active compromised links ratio of RoK and RGM in case of a temporary 
attacker with capture rates of 1, 3, and 5 per round, memory size is 500 for both of RoK 
and RGM, key pool size is 28000 for RoK and 10000 for RGM. 
 
Figure 5.12. Total compromised links ratio of RoK and RGM in case of an eager 
attacker with capture rates of 1, 3, and 5 per round, memory size is 500 for both of RoK 
and RGM, key pool size is 28000 for RoK and 10000 for RGM. 
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Figure 5.13 depicts local connectivity of both schemes in this scenario. Although 
the keyring size of RoK scheme is increased as compared to previous scenario, the key 
pool size is also enlarged so that the local connectivity stays the same as RGM scheme 
at 0.9.  
 
Figure 5.13. Local connectivity of RoK and RGM, memory size is 500 for both of RoK 
and RGM, key pool size is 28000 for RoK and 10000 for RGM. 
5.3.6.  Discussions of Memory Requirements in RGM 
Abovementioned scenarios show that the proposed RGM scheme has better 
resiliency than RoK, but it requires more keys in the keyring. Especially Scenario 2 
(Section 5.3.4) clearly states this difference; in order to have 0.9 local connectivity, 
RoK needs 300 keys, whereas RGM needs 500 keys in the keyring. However, as 
analyzed below, the amount of key memory that RGM uses covers only a small portion 
of the data memory of the state-of-the-art sensor nodes. Assuming that 128-bit keys are 
used and another 16 bits are employed for key identification, the amount of key memory 
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used for RGM is 9000 bytes. In parallel with latest advances in sensor node technology, 
storage capabilities are increased. For example, MICAz [20] and IRIS [21] have 128 
Kbytes of flash memory that can be used for key storage. The flash memory capacity of 
TinyNode584 [22] is 512 Kbytes. In our RGM scheme, the memory requirement for 
keys is less than 10 Kbytes that comprises of a small portion of the flash memory of 
state-of-the-art sensor nodes. 
5.4.  Discussions and Conclusions 
In this section we proposed a random key predistribution scheme, called RGM, 
for multi-phase wireless sensor networks. In our RGM scheme, each redeployed node 
comes with a refreshed set of generation keys so that capture of a node that belong to a 
particular generation has minimal effect on the keys between nodes of other 
generations. In this way, the value of the information learned by the attacker is reduced 
and, therefore, the resiliency of the network is improved. Our scheme also takes care of 
the cryptographic connectivity of the newly deployed nodes with their physical 
neighbors. The simulative performance analyses show that our scheme performs up to 
35% better resiliency under heavy attacks as compared to well-known RoK scheme [9] 
with the cost of 10% degradation from perfect cryptographic connectivity. Thus, our 
scheme provides a good tradeoff in favor of security. It is also worthwhile to mention 
that the connectivity value of 0.9 does not make any node disconnected from the 
network. The network still operates securely with this rate.  
Our extensive analyses also show that even with the same keyring size and the 
same connectivity level, total resiliency of our RGM scheme is still better than RoK in 
all capture rates as the attack continues. 
We also analyzed key pool utilization of both RGM and RoK schemes in all three 
scenarios in order to further justify the memory requirement of the RGM scheme. Key 
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pool utilization metric shows the percentage of the keys in the key pools that are used in 
one or more link keys. The results are given in Table 5.1. As can be seen from this 
table, key pool utilization of RGM is lower than that of RoK scheme in all scenarios. 
That is why RGM scheme needs more keys in the keyrings in order to reach an 
acceptable level of local connectivity. Lower key pool utilization also shows that the 
attacker learns less valuable information out of the captured nodes in our RGM scheme 
as compared to rival RoK scheme. Thus, even with more keys per node, the resiliency 
of RGM is generally better than RoK.  
Table 5.1. Key pool utilization 
RGM 
Scenario 1, 2 and 3 
RoK 
Scenario 1 
RoK 
Scenario 2 
RoK 
Scenario 3 
11.2% 100% 99.5% 85.9% 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis we proposed three different random key predistribution schemes for 
wireless sensor networks. Our first scheme uses a combination of XORed and single 
keys, therefore it has two different key pools and two different keyrings. In our scheme, 
we introduced the transfer phase which increases the local connectivity. The keys 
transferred in this phase are not used directly; but, they are XORed prior to usage as link 
keys. Hence, capture of a neighbor node from which the keys are transferred does not 
mean compromise of the link. Attacker may still have not enough information about the 
link key. In this way, we keep the resilience of our scheme under control. Simulation 
results show that this proposed scheme achieves higher local connectivity than basic 
scheme while using the same total keyring sizes. However, the mixture of single and 
XORed keys must be somehow balanced. Resilience performance of our scheme is 
better at the beginning of the attack as compared to basic scheme. As the attack 
continues, resilience of our scheme starts to deteriorate after 60% of the links are 
compromised. However, the resiliency of our scheme never becomes more than 5% 
worse than the basic scheme. 
Our second scheme is an extension to the basic scheme with its additional transfer 
phase. Our proposed transfer phase increases the cryptographic local connectivity of the 
network drastically after shared-key discovery phase is performed. When keyring size is 
220 keys in basic scheme [4], local connectivity becomes 1.0 after shared-key discovery 
phase is performed. The same local connectivity is achieved by using keyring size of 
only 55 keys in our scheme. Moreover, the fraction of communications compromised in 
our scheme stays lower than basic scheme with shared-key discovery phase up to 50%. 
Our transfer phase can also be thought as a better alternative to the path-key 
establishment phase of basic scheme. Our analysis shows that our scheme has the same 
1.0 local connectivity with basic scheme with path-key establishment phase although it 
81 
 
uses 20 and 50 fewer keys when the key pool size is 10,000 and 100,000 respectively. It 
also has the same resiliency performance with basic scheme with path-key 
establishment phase in this setup. Furthermore, the number of messages sent in order to 
establish new secure links after failure in shared-key discovery phase is 1 message 
fewer on the average in transfer phase as compared to path-key establishment phase. 
Finally, we proposed a key predistribution scheme for multi-phase wireless sensor 
networks called RGM (Random Generation Material). In RGM, generation key pool is 
refreshed in each generation randomly and independent of other generations, so an 
attacker having information about previous or future states of the pool cannot guess the 
current state. This is a good property for restricting the amount of knowledge that the 
attacker knows and, therefore, improving resilience performance. Resilience 
performance of our RGM scheme is up to 35% better as compared to RoK scheme [9]. 
While having this success in resilience, local connectivity performance drops by 10%. 
Despite the deterioration, the network is still connected via secure neighbors and 
operates without any problem. 
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